Over the past 60 years, there have been a number of attempts to centralise policing and bring into effect a national strategy for addressing crime. The Police Act of 1964 reduced the number of police forces from 123 to the 43 territorial police forces that exist today and the proceeding Police Act of 1996 conferred upon the Home Secretary the power to set national policing priorities. However, there is evidence to suggest that certain elements of the structure of policing should be further overhauled.
Digital Infrastructure
One issue in particular which has been consistently highlighted as problematic is the lack of a shared national digital infrastructure between police forces. ‘A New Force’, a report published by Reform in 2009, noted that such a fragmented approach has historically stymied the effectiveness of intelligence sharing and resulted in inefficiencies in police spending. The report identified that “there is no single IT system that forces can use. The 43 forces pay 43 times to develop 43 different IT systems”. Forces which had proactively addressed this situation had evidenced significant cost savings through economies of scale and resource sharing. The police forces for Kent and Essex had taken a collaborative approach to procurement and generated savings of £2.8 million between 2007 and the report’s publication. In addition, Avon & Somerset and Gloucestershire police forces had pooled resources to purchase a helicopter which would not have been financially viable had each force acted alone.
In 2012, Nick Herbert, the then Minister for Policing and Criminal Justice noted that “there are 2,000 systems between the 43 forces of England and Wales, and individual forces have not always driven the most effective deals”.This was to be addressed by the Police ICT Company (now the Police Digital Service), a bespoke body jointly owned by the Association of Police Authorities and the Home Office. However, in 2021, an inspection of the regional organised crime units (ROCUs) found that, despite having “good access to intelligence” and performing well, these units “had to work with multiple intelligence systems in different forces”. These issues meant that “the process for exchanging some sensitive intelligence was inefficient, mainly due to limitations in technology”. In some instances, “hard copies of intelligence reports are still being moved across the country”, a situation which was described as unacceptable. HMICFRS concluded that “more needs to be done to improve digital access across the network and other agencies”. The above evidence suggests that, despite efforts to overhaul and improve the digital infrastructure available to police forces and other designated law enforcement units, significant challenges persist which call for further investment and development.
Encouragingly, the challenges brought by disparate systems have been acknowledged in its National Policing Digital Strategy 2020-2030, noting that key actions will be to “invest in common connected technology development to benefit from economies of scale” and “adopt digital technologies[...]to deliver more targeted and digital supported interventions to prevent harm, across forces and with partners, in a streamlined and efficient manner”.
However, there are a number of issues previously highlighted which the National Policing Digital Strategy does not address. These are very basic challenges, such as adequate access to hardware, which prevent police officers and staff from being able to undertake their duties and function effectively. The 2018 CPaCC National Police ICT Survey highlighted significant discontent amongst police personnel, having received 3,980 responses. Two key results from officers and staff are displayed below:
55 percent were dissatisfied with their force’s overall ICT provision
65 percent said they were able to access a computer when needed
51 percent said their force can provide a mobile data device fit for purpose if needed
This can be observed on both the national scale and within the Metropolitan Police; the Met Survey May 2022 showed that just 49 percent of those who responded felt they had technology to use that makes their job easier. Insufficiency of resources in purely quantitative terms may also be compounded by the influx of officers recruited throughout the Police Uplift Programme. The National Digital Policing Strategy 2020-2030 will surely be a welcome response to many long-standing issues with the digital infrastructure available to forces. However, if challenges such as the above, like not being able to access a computer or mobile device when necessary, are not resolved, then the investment may not engender the positive results it aims to achieve. It is therefore recommended that the Home Office works collaboratively with police forces at the local level to complete a national audit of available hardware to ensure that, in tandem with the upgrades provided by the PDS, officers and staff are able to access the technology required to fulfil their duties.
Merging Smaller Forces
In 2005, His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) presented a report to the Home Secretary which concerned whether the 43 force structure was “the right one to meet the challenges posed by the current and future policing environment”. The principal aim of the report was to establish how the structure of police forces might be adapted in order to “provide effective and sustainable protective services to a common standard in future”.
One of the key issues identified was that forces below a certain size tended, though not without exception, to perform worse than forces with 4,000 officers or more. As previously discussed in this report, part of this problem stems from the fact that discrete forces tend to operate discrete systems for matters such as IT, HR, payroll, and intelligence, thus generating the need to dedicate substantial resources 43 times over. Additionally, the report noted that multiple components of protective services cause severe surges in spending which in turn placed significant financial burdens on forces. Smaller forces were typically less financially resilient and therefore “much more likely to apply for special grants”.
At the time of the report’s publication, it was estimated that savings generated through potential mergers could amount to £70 million in one year, with additional productivity gains of up to £250 million being realised in subsequent years. A range of analyses were considered, amounting to net present values (NPVs) of between £560 million and £2.25 billion. As such, the business case for consolidating smaller forces is well evidenced, particularly given the ongoing move for efficiency in policing.
However, it was not simply the business case which underpinned the need to establish a “more efficient, integrated operating platform above BCU level”. Performance on level 2 measures such as counter-terrorism, domestic extremism, serious and organised crime, and public order was generally higher for larger forces.
Figure 13: Overall trend for protective services - force size versus inspectorate score. Source: HMIC.
Much of the challenge inherent in redefining the 43 police force structure originates from the seemingly competing priorities of local, regional, and national policing. As noted in the report, “the organisation of service delivery must be on a scale large enough to respond dynamically, but local enough to understand the diverse context within which it operates”. The report acknowledged the findings of the National Reassurance Policing Project of 2002 that “people identified strongly with an identifiable, named local officer”. Although, importance was also afforded to the contingent of people who valued links at the country/supra-county level. Ultimately, it was felt that reform of the 43 police force structure was possible whilst maintaining the neighbourhood policing presence so valued by local communities. In part, this involved providing reassurance “that local arrangements - ie at BCU and neighbourhood level - will not change”.The report put forward several potential solutions for this reform which would need to account for the size, mix of capabilities, criminal markets, geography, risk, coterminosity, and identity.
Collaboration
HMIC noted that this option was less favourable, largely due to significant problems having been observed with force collaboration up until the point of the report’s publication. In particular, the report acknowledged challenges with governance, performance, and accountability which would, at best “be complex, slow and of limited impact”. This may have changed since the publication of the report and bears revisiting as a potential option.
Lead force for specialist capabilities
This option would see forces merged with ‘partners’ being reallocated to certain types of crime. Whilst this option was felt to be viable “in theory, and with funding”, HMIC noted that it would not necessarily overcome more fundamental issues identified in its work to date. Furthermore, this option would have “significant implications for smaller forces in relation to the control and direction of enquiries conducted within their own borders”.
Lead regional force
In this scenario, forces would build upon existing infrastructure, processes and partnership arrangements. One force within an association of chief police officers (ACPO) region would be resourced as the lead force to host personnel, finance and logistics of the regional protective services requirements on behalf of other partners. This could potentially address the inefficiencies identified within the disparate back office arrangements of the 43 force structure. However, HMIC also noted that this could engender challenges with integration, accountability, and the perception that ACPO regions are “artificial entities”.
Federation of forces
Under this arrangement, forces below HMIC’s accepted standard could self-reform to be unified entities. Federations would utilise a common set of protective services with the potential to brigade support services. This option presents the key advantage of balancing local, regional, and national priorities as local policing, including BCU, would be preserved. However, the major barrier to this option is that impetus for pursuing federation is the concerned forces’ dissatisfaction for the status quo. Federation also suffers from similar issues to options 1 and 3 in that there may be confusion over priorities, accountability, and governance.
Strategic forces
This option would require the most significant degree of reform and therefore would require leadership, extensive support, and national will. The redevelopment of the current 43 force structure would see forces regrouped against the aforementioned factors of size, criminality, and geography. HMIC described this option for reform as “the clearest and most business-like”, with the potential to enact a prescriptive reform approach. This would, however, be contingent upon the appointment of a new executive and strategic authority being appointed at an early stage which may require substantial investment upfront.
Whilst local policing arrangements would not be disrupted whilst force level services were rationalised, HMIC notes that this approach could be perceived as “disruptive and least ‘locally friendly’.
Ultimately, it was concluded that “the 43 force structure is no longer fit for purpose” and that “in the interests of the efficiency and effectiveness of policing it should change”. HMIC’s recommendation at the time was that the strategic forces approach to reform would offer the best business solution.
Whilst the Labour Government accepted this report and introduced proposals for reform in 2006, they were ultimately rejected in the face of strong opposition. Successive governments have since “rejected arguments for compulsory top-down mergers, urging greater collaboration instead”. This potentially follows the 2012 report from HMIC titled ‘Increasing efficiency in the Police Service’, which examined the potential benefits of greater collaboration between forces in lieu of more radical reform. Referenced previously, one of the examples of this increased collaboration between forces are ROCUs. The 2021 ‘State of Policing’ report notes that “the ROCU network had made substantial progress in some respects, particularly in cyber-crime and undercover policing”. In spite of this, the fragmented nature of the 43 force structure still acts a barrier in other areas, with significant inconsistencies having been observed throughout England and Wales in the “resourcing, leadership and operation of ROCUs”.
There are also more recent advocates for reform of this nature. In 2020, Martin Hewitt, Chair of the National Police Chiefs Council, urged the Government to initiate a review as part of its wider overhaul of the criminal justice system. This idea has also been supported by Sir Mark Rowley, Dame Cressida Dick, the Police Federation of England and Wales, and the Police Superintendents Association. Ultimately, this demonstrates that whilst there may have previously been significant outcry at the prospect of reform, such attitudinal obstacles may have since been abated. Presently, the approach of the government is aligned to its 2019 manifesto, which included:
Increasing police powers
Devolutionist policy which affords powers to city region mayors, Police and Crime Commissioners (PCCs)
Increasing the strength of police forces across the country
Adapting the governance structure of the police, placing greater accountability of PCCs
Providing police officers with the equipment they need (through initiatives such as the Police Digital Service)
Judicial reform to legislation such as the Human Rights Act and the Crime and Courts Act
These manifesto commitments address a number of challenges identified throughout our investigation into UK crime statistics, such as the back office inefficiencies discussed previously. However, it remains to be seen whether the level 2 gap caused by the disparate 43-force model and central to HMIC’s 2005 evaluation will be resolved through such commitments. As such, it is recommended that the Home Office commissions a renewed and bespoke evaluation of this service provision, subject to a satisfactory period of implementation of the government’s manifesto commitments on policing.