I am thrilled to share that I will be a speaker at this year's TEDx Soho!

On June 17th at Cambridge Theatre I'll be sharing my ideas on the TEDx stage for the first time. Tickets are available here. This year's theme is "All the World's a Stage."

Globally, locally, and digitally; this quote never felt so relevant. The driving force behind this event is the desire to share and celebrate the ideas and accomplishments of the incredible people and industries who call this famous corner of London home and who are doing their part to set a new stage, for a brighter future.

The month of June is looking to be a pretty important one for me as the paperback of 'The Power of the Outsider' will also be released. It has been an incredible journey sharing this book with the world so far. Pre-order the paperback now via Amazon and Waterstones. I will also be visiting the Middle East as part of the tail end of my extended book tour and will be speaking at Bradford Literary Festival.

Don't miss out on this incredible TEDx Soho event! Hope to see you there.

Thanks

Here in the UK on January 24^th I will be helping to unveil a new plaque to commemorate where MLK preached his first message in the United Kingdom. He preached at Bloomsbury Central Baptist Church, Shaftesbury Avenue on 29^th October 1961.

Accounts from those present tell us that the sermon King delivered at Bloomsbury was “The Three Dimensions of a Complete Life,” in which he used the image of the new Jerusalem from the Book of Revelation to call people to a life of equal length, breadth, and height.

By King’s exegesis, a “long” life is one where a person’s talents are harnessed and developed to the full, a “broad” life has an outgoing concern for the welfare of others, and a life of “height” intentionally includes God as the pinnacle of a complete life, recognising that personal and humanitarian concerns are too small without this third dimension.

It is very likely that you will have both heard of and quoted those famous words spoken at the Lincoln Memorial on August 28^th 1963. “I Have a Dream''. The Rev Martin Luther King Jr led 250,000 people on a march on Washington for jobs and freedom singing ‘we shall overcome’. It would go down in history as the significant moment in the civil rights struggle.

It was not the first protest in Washington and was not his first speech. It was, however, a moment where preparation met performance like never before. In 2024, with elections taking place across many of the most significant democracies in the world including the United States, United Kingdom, and India, political leaders will hope that the preparation for their campaigns will meet performance resulting in victory. But the difference between many of these leaders and Rev King is that more important than his preparation and performance were his purpose and principles.

Rev King was fighting for a just cause. The hope of a secure and liveable world where justice, equality and freedom could reign supreme. This was something that he was willing to dedicate his whole life to and ultimately to die for. Contrast that with a political class that often is focused on winning at any expense.

In the United Kingdom, since the arrival of the spin doctor under Tony Blair and the subsequent importation of Australian electoral expertise; there has been a hyper denigration of how our politics is done. Wedge issues is the aim of the game. The focus is simply exploiting the fears of citizens in order to win with no thought of the long-term ramifications of what will be left behind when an election has long passed.

I remember going to see a famous election guru after giving a television interview in my early 20s. I explained to him why I was warning about the demographic changes in the United Kingdom and what this could mean for the long term if the party he was helping did not adapt. His response was “Samuel, you’re right. But my job isn’t to worry about the long term. My job is to win the next election.” He delivered on that objective but since then we have had some turbulent and divisive years as a nation… not his problem he would argue.

Many are expecting this year to bring some of the most brutally fought political contests we have ever seen. Elections should not be fought like an Ultimate Fight Championship match with fighters beating each other to a pulp and then shaking hands afterwards. In a general election we are all participants. We all feel the effects of a punch.

Whatever the outcomes of the elections ahead, I think we must somehow get to a moment where principled people are able to rise to the top of our politics and those that govern recognise the weight of responsibility that comes with leading a party during an election. We do not want any more members of parliament to lose their lives at the hands of someone radicalised by rhetoric. Our politicians must campaign responsibly.

We would like to invite you to the inaugural Civil Society Leaders Gathering at the House of Commons.

• Date: Wednesday January 24^th, 2024

• Registration: Click Here

This unique gathering of the most senior figures in the sector will feature a high level panel exploring what transformational leadership must look like after the events of the past few years including the pandemic, cost of living crisis, and outbreak of wars. Confirmed speakers include:

• Helen Stevenson: CEO of the Charity Commission

• Javed Khan: Former CEO of Bernardo’s and author of the government’s independent review into making Britain smoke free

• Michael Adamson: CEO of British Red Cross

• Tessy Ojo: CEO of the Diana Award

Former Downing Street advisor for Civil Society Samuel Kasumu will be speaking about his new book (The Power of the Outsider) and New York Times journalist Jonathan Eig will be coming from the US to discuss his new book about Martin Luther King Jnr (King A Life). The Minister for Civil Society is expected to give an address too.

Join MPs, Peers, Councillors, and civil society leaders at an important gathering at the turn of the year.

• Registration: Click Here

Why Cohousing ?

It works for people and it works for places – and it would work towards solving the housing crisis if the government invested in it.

What is Cohousing ?

Cohousing is an approach to creating a community, an ‘intentional community’: people living in a way that they themselves have created to embody their shared values.  The key principles are:-

• To create a balance between privacy and community

• Designed to encourage social interaction

• Residents are the decision makers and contribute to the overall design

• Homes can be for sale or rent but must be affordable and not for profit

• All buildings must be environmentally sustainable

In general a cohousing community will be made up of between 10 and 40 households; preferably multigenerational and including families and singletons. Other models do exist - such as women or older people only. Each household has their own accommodation, with their own front door, plus access to common areas such as a meeting room, kitchen, laundry, guest rooms, car sharing etc. Access to outside space is also essential for gardening / shared growing.

Cohousing is common in Europe, Scandinavia, the USA and Australia. At present there are a small but growing number of Cohousing communities across the UK, mainly in England. The UK housing sector is strongly polarised between a commercial developer-led private sector on the one hand and state-subsidised social provision on the other. Cohousing is an alternative option, a middle way, which is under represented and undervalued by most UK politicians – especially given the benefits it can provide

What are the benefits?

• People living in a cohousing community benefit from reduced social isolation, and gain emotional and physical support from their neighbours

• They share skills and learn from each other, this is especially important for single person households and those with children

• Living in a Cohousing community can provide a richer experience for children and teenagers leading to improved social outcomes

• Older people are more independent and autonomous, living longer, healthier lives

• Residents often find they have more spare time for themselves due to the sharing of day to day chores, repairs and maintenance etc

• People report being able to afford a bigger and more sustainable property, with more outside space, because their capital and overhead costs are shared

Cohousing is also beneficial to the wider community, often providing much needed neighbourhood amenities and facilities such as co-working spaces and meeting rooms. These communities reduce stress on Local Authority resources by increasing housing stock which is built to higher evironmental standards and reduces dependence on public services, especially health. Sharing cars also contributes to reduced pressure on roads and the environment. Cohousing communitities are more outward looking, helping to build their wider community by ‘reaching out’ and by increasing involvement in local campaigns and civic activities. Last but not least, Cohousing employs specific legal structures which protect the affordability of its properties in perpetuity.

Why isn’t it more common / what are the challenges ?

The main barriers to the development of Cohousing are land and money. The optimum land requirement is 1 – 2 acres; this might be a feasible purchase in rural areas but is nigh impossible in the cities, where most land is swiftly gobbled up by developers, usually in collusion with local authorities. Renovation of large redundant properties is also an opportunity for Cohousing.  In Scotland, recent changes in the law mean that land and property can sometimes be bought through a ‘Community Asset Transfer’ but in practice this is a long and difficult process and the provision of housing for individuals is often not eligible for support.

Many Cohousing projects are self funded with money being raised from individuals as well as a collective loan or mortgage. However, difficulties in  raising ‘start up’ funds to pay for development costs such as feasibility studies, architect drawings, planning permission, conspire to prevent many groups from ever getting as far as applying for a loan or mortgage. The provision of housing  for indivuals is not a charitable objective, so while small amounts of funding might be available for peripheral benefits such as community facilities, this is supplementary rather than core funding. Building Societies such as the Ecology, Banks such as Triodos and various crowd funding intiatives can all provide core finance for building Cohousing communities, but only once the groundwork has been laid and a viable business and delivery plan developed. This is where financial support from Government could have the most impact.

In terms of ongoing/delivery funding, a model developed by the ‘Lilac’ project in Leeds, which is becoming more common, is for a Mutual Home Ownership Society (MHOS) to be established. This is a legal structure for a Housing Cooperative and its rules have been approved by the Financial Conduct Authority. An ‘MHOS’ enables people to club together to buy or build homes that they might not otherwise be able to afford. Their properties are ‘asset locked’ thus providing a route to permanently affordable communities. A similar but two tier model has been developed in York where “Yorspace” was established as a Community Land Trust and secured grant funding (no longer available) towards a deposit for land purchase. A Mutual Home Ownership Society (co-op) was then established to fund and build the homes.

What can be done to encourage more Cohousing?

Central Government could do much more to encourage community led Cohousing developments, specifically with the provision of grant funding to assist with the development phase. Housing departments across the country should be resourced to offer information, advice and financial support to nascent Cohousing groups. Maybe a ‘Cohousing Conference’ would be a good place to start?

Supporting information

- The UK Cohousing Network has a useful website with details of both established and developing cohousing projects in England

https://cohousing.org.uk/

Two particularly interesting articles they have published include:

https://cohousing.org.uk/news/cohousing-and-public-benefit/

https://cohousing.org.uk/case-study/partnership-route-cohousing/

- the first successful Cohousing Community was established in Stroud in the early 2000s, funded solely with residents’ own money

https://www.therightplace.net/coco/public/

- another of the earliest examples was the Older Womens cohousing initiative in London (now called New Ground)

https://www.communityledhousing.london/project/older-womens-co-housing/

https://newgroundcohousing.uk/

- one of the best known cohousing communities in England is ‘Lilac’ – especially as they are responsible for developing the  ‘Mutual Home Ownership’ model for shared ownership / purchase

http://www.lilac.coop/our-story-2/

- similarly  Yorspace, has developed a new model – fortunate to benefit from some grant funding and support from their local council.

https://yorspace.org/

https://yorspace.org/uploads/Yorspace-A4.pdf

- finally, Cohousing Scotland, is a newly formed lobbying and support group for Cohousing groups north of the border

https://www.cohousing.scot/

Positive momentous strides have been made for the perception and treatment of autism in the UK.  Shifting the view of autism from a pathology to a natural variation in the way that humans process information has been a cornerstone of the disability rights and neurodiversity movements. The medical model of autism needs to accommodate these movements whilst still ensuring that there is an accessible and effective diagnostic process, one which is geared towards accommodating support needs instead of producing normative behaviours. Moreover, with employment rates for autistic people at an estimated 22%, it is clear that there is much work to be done. Companies around the world are making changes to their hiring practices, including scrapping interviews in favour of more accommodating processes and changing internal perceptions of desirable qualities. Organisations, however, still need to change their consideration of reasonable adjustments to improve working environments for autistic people. Perhaps even more crucially, making and understanding the business case for neurodiversity in the workplace is crucial to encouraging this change, but that does not mean that autistic people who do not exhibit extraordinary abilities should be excluded in the process. Change can accommodate the needs of everyone. 

Cambridge academic Baron-Cohen states that “autism and Asperger’s syndrome often (perhaps invariably) involve areas of strength—such as remarkable attention to detail, the ability to focus on a small topic for long periods, and to see repeating patterns—and these human qualities are not in need of treatment.”. Neurodiversity is valuable, both in the personal and individual sense, but can also bring benefit in the professional sphere. The inclusion of neurodiversity to the wider conversation on diversity. It is crucial to forming and building truly inclusive teams, as well as encompassing a broader range of considerations when improving inclusive professional provisions.  

Mckinsey & Company have released a series of reports which encompass the business case for diversity. Their 2019 study found that “companies in the top quartile for gender diversity on executive teams were 25 percent more likely to have above-average profitability than companies in the fourth quartile - up from 21 percent in 2017 and 15 percent in 2014”. Furthermore, they found that “the greater the representation, the higher the likelihood of outperformance. Companies with more than 30 percent women executives were more likely to outperform companies where this percentage ranged from 10 to 30, and in turn these companies were more likely to outperform those with even fewer women executives, or none at all.”. The differential is substantial, at 48%. Gender diversity is not the only factor which impacts positively on company performance either. Ethnic diversity is also crucial to successful organisations - in the same study, Mckinsey & Company found that “top-quartile companies outperformed those in the fourth one by 36 percent, slightly up from 33 percent in 2017 and 35 percent in 2014”. Diverse employees with various backgrounds and thought processes bring unique expertise organisations which optimise problem solving. 

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There has not yet been as much research into quantifiable benefits of neurodiversity in the workplace, though preliminary results are compelling. Research by Ruzich et al. discovered that the proportion of individuals who exhibit neurodiverse traits working in STEM is much larger than in other industries, suggesting that those with abilities such as attention to detail and hyperfocus are a beneficial, if partially untapped, talent pool for particular disciplines. The competitive advantages of neurodiversity builds on the well-documented business case for diversity in organisations. Hewlett Packard Enterprise (HPE) have engaged in a program designed to place more neurodiverse individuals in software-testing roles at Australia’s Department of Humans Services (DHS), whilst also ensuring that workplaces accommodate individuals’ support needs. Preliminary results found that neurodiverse testing teams are 30% more productive than others.  

The Australian Defense Department is now working with HPE to develop a neurodiversity program in cybersecurity. When assessing candidates for roles, the department has discovered levels of ability that far outweigh previous expectations of individual capacity for pattern finding within complex data. 

Despite these benefits, unemployment amongst autistic people remains incommensurably high. A study by Austin and Pisano describes a candidate with a CV featuring two master’s degrees, both with honors, and demonstrable ability in mathematical ability and software development. Credentials notwithstanding, the candidate had been unemployed for two years prior due to inaccessible hiring processes. Data supplied by the Office for National Statistics (ONS) in 2020 suggests that the unemployment rate amongst autistic adults in the UK is 78%, which is even lower than previous data suggests. This figure is corroborated by the aforementioned study, which suggests a similar figure of 80% for neurodiverse candidates. Moreover, when these candidates are working, they appear to often be underemployed. This is largely due to HR and recruitment processes which are “developed toward wide application across the organisation[...] there is a conflict between scalability and the goal of acquiring neurodiverse talent”.  Anka Wittenberg, the Chief Diversity and Inclusion Officer for SAP, argues that if blanket processes are applied in the hiring process, the company would “miss people with autism”. The social behaviours of neurodiverse people often oppose common notions of what makes a good employee - “solid communication skills, being a team player, emotional intelligence, persuasiveness, salesperson-type personalities, the ability to network, the ability to conform to standard practices without special accommodations, and so on.”. That is not to say that neurodiverse people cannot engage in these behaviours, but in doing so they may also have to engage in masking - the processes of performing normative behaviours - which can lead to burnout and disengagement. One process which is almost universal in the hiring process, interviewing, can preclude neurodiverse people from obtaining employment which reflects their ability. Traits which are often associated with neurodiverse candidates such as not making the expected level of eye contact, entering conversational tangents, or being overly honest about their weaknesses can lead to lower scores in interviews. Specialisterne, a social innovation company, created a process called “hangouts”, comfortable gatherings usually lasting half a day, whereby neurodiverse candidates can demonstrate their abilities in casual interactions with managerial staff. Following this process, some candidates are selected for two to six weeks of further assessment and training, involving activities which are gradually scaled to become more like the typical work day. These efforts are typically government or not-for-profit funded and trainees are usually paid. 

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The second problem, as described by Austin and Pisano, is the assumption that “scalable processes require absolute conformity to standardised approaches. Employees in neurodiversity programs typically need to be allowed to deviate from established practices.”. This does not mean that neurodiverse candidates are not compliant with organisational operations, but rather that managers undergo a shift from standardisation to adjusting individual work contexts. Most solutions, such as providing noise-cancelling headphones, and installing different lighting systems are inexpensive, but do require tailoring individual work settings more than is typically expected. These accommodations can be considered reasonable adjustments under the Equality Act 2010. 

The assumption of the coincidence of savant like ability - defined as an incongruent contrast to an overall disability - is problematic.The next section of this report will refer to incredible examples of neurodiverse talent now and throughout history, but it is crucial to support all neurodiverse people, whether or not they exhibit exceptional ability. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights enshrines the right to work, where everyone has the right (1) to free choice of employment, to just and favourable conditions of work and to protection against unemployment, (2) the right to equal pay for equal work, without any discrimination, (3) to just and favourable remuneration, ensuring for himself and his family an existence worthy of human dignity, and supplemented, if necessary, by other means of social protection, and (4) to form and join trade unions for the protection of his interests. Denying any employee, or prospective employee their right to equal opportunity in the workplace is discrimination, which the Equality Act 2010 outlawed in the United Kingdom. So long as  person A can fulfil their obligations to an employer and produce work which is considered “like B’s work”, “rated as equivalent to B’s work, or”, “of equal value to B’s work”, then person A must be afforded equal opportunity. Autistic people and, more broadly, neurodiverse people are worthy of respect and dignity regardless of whether their condition affords them extraordinary commodifiable abilities.  

Examples of Exceptional Neurodiversity:

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Spaces are extremely limited. If you are interested in attending please register by clicking here. 

There is a wealth of research which indicates that substance use is a matter of health rather than proclivity to criminal (read immoral) behaviour. However, policies which pursue substance use as a matter of law rather than vulnerability have been central to the United Kingdom’s approach in addressing this matter. Such a stance has resulted in a deep and complex link between crime and substance use which extends beyond the prohibition and sanctioning of the latter  For example, alcohol or substance use, whether used personally or experienced by proxy of a family or household member is defined by the then Public Health England as a key risk factor for children’s exposure to crime. This link is also evident in a bevy of governmental policy and strategy documents; as noted by His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Probation, “both drug and alcohol misuse are included as offending-related factors”. An academic study identified the drugs-crime association as “an important driver of UK policy, reflected in its prominence in the drug strategies of successive governments”. There are three broad explanations for this association:

1. Forward causation, wherein the user engages in criminal activity either: (a) to acquire funds for their habit through illicit means, or (b) due to psychopharmacological changes engendered by their use of substances. 

2. Reverse causation, wherein involvement with other types of crime increases the likelihood of contact with and use of drugs. 

3. Confounding, whereby drug use and criminal activity share a common set of causes; there is not a direct causal link between the two but rather a shared antecedent(s).

The study went on to note that underlying causal mechanisms are unlikely to be as simple as this tripartite framework suggests, but rather a more complex set of social phenomena. Irrespective of the causes, for cohorts studied in this research - offending increased correlatively with opiate use. For men, the rate of historical offending for opiate positive cases was almost double that for test-negative controls (rate per year, opiate users: 1.82; non-users 0.91; p< 0.001). For opiate-positive women, the rate was over four times that for test-negative women (opiate users: 1.39; non-users: 0.33; p < 0.001). This is consistent with other studies into substance use and crime.

However, another recent study by Hakansson and Jesionowska shows that the drug-crime association does not equate to a blanket correlation between all types of crime and a history of usage. Factors including a history of binge drinking, use of sedatives, and male gender were positively associated with violent crime, whereas use of heroin, amphetamine, cocaine, and injecting drug use were negatively associated with violent crime. The majority of offences committed by people who use substances are acquisitive in nature, ranging from what has been dubbed ‘non-serious acquisitive crimes’ such as shoplifting to ‘serious acquisitive crime’ such as burglary. Such crimes can be viewed as the outcomes of addiction, relating more strongly to the forward causation identified previously, whereas risk of substance use can be tied to risk of exposure to substances through other criminal activity. The legal framework for ‘drug-related crime’ offers nine categories of offence, including those relating to:

1. Possession

2. Supply

3. Importation

4. Production

5. Occupier

6. Opium

7. Supply of articles

8. Inchoate

9. Obstruction

Offences other than possession undoubtedly cause a significant amount of harm because it enables drug use and therefore puts individuals at risk of health related harms. Furthermore, supply of illicit substances may provide the prerequisite conditions to other criminal behaviour, such as acquisitive crimes, as illustrated above. It should be noted that there are critics who suggest that much of this harm stems from the unintended consequences of prohibition, including the illicit drugs market which was estimated to be worth £9.4 billion by the Government. Whilst addressing the broader consequences of UK drug policy is a matter of significant concern, a more immediate and highly contested issue is whether possession of a controlled substance for personal use only should be decriminalised or even legalised for a variety of reasons..

As of the 31st of December 2022, there were 81,806 prisoners held in England and Wales, 10,855 of which were held on drug offences. After violence against the person and sexual offences, this is the third highest offence category for those in custody. There are more people held in custody for drug offences than for robbery, criminal damage and arson, possession of weapons, and fraud offences combined. 

Figure 20: Prison population by offence as of 31 December 2022. Source: Justice Data. 

This data source does not differentiate between the three broad categories of drug offences and therefore it is not possible to discern the proportion of the total prison population held for possession of a controlled drug without intent to supply. However, it can be observed from other sources that between 2010 and 2020, a total of 85,358 standard determinate sentences were handed out for all drug offences,10,494 (12.29 percent) of which were for possession without intent to supply. 3,143 of these were for cannabis.

You will have heard many different versions of what it costs to house a prisoner. The Ministry of Justice has two methods of calculating cost per prisoner, either via direct resource expenditure or through overall resource expenditure. 2020/21 figures show that direct resource expenditure per prison was £32,716 per year (£89.63 per day) or £48,409 per year (£132.62 per day) using overall resource expenditure. The average custodial service length for possession of a controlled drug without intent to supply was 2.7 months in 2020.

The United Kingdom has a long history of legislative and regulatory reform with respect to controlled substances. From the International Commissions held at Shanghai in 1909 and the Hague Convention of 1912 to the Misuse of Drugs act 1971 and the Drugs Act 2005, an increasingly so-called ‘hardline’ approach to the use of drugs has developed over time. Such policy is rooted in good intentions with the broad aim of reducing drug production, distribution, and use due to the harm it causes to both the user and others.

However, as evidenced by the aforementioned statistics on the prison population of England and Wales, this has resulted in the criminalisation of people who use drugs in addition to those manufacturing and disseminating controlled substances. Equally, the efficacy of this approach has repeatedly been called into question, not least because the assumption that incarceration is an effective method for reducing the rate of substance use is not steeped in hard evidence. The ‘Prison Drugs Strategy’ produced by HM Prison & Probation Service notes that “the rate of positive random tests for ‘traditional’ drugs’ in prisons increased by 50% from 7% to 10.6%” between 2012/13 and 2017/18. This figure was higher than that identified amongst the non-prison population in the CSEW 2018/19 (9.4 percent). Just think about that for a second. You are more likely to be found to be using an illegal substance if you are in prison than if you are not…

Figure 21: Proportion of adults aged 16 to 59 years and 16 to 24 years reporting use of any drug, any Class A drug and cannabis in the last year, England and Wales, year ending December 1995 to year ending June 2022. Source:Office for National Statistics. 

On the point of deterrence, the CSEW indicates that drug use amongst both of the specified age groups has declined, although this is much more pronounced in the 16 to 24 age group. Cannabis use has also decreased more significantly than Class A drug usage in both groups. Whilst an actual decline in substance use may be responsible for this trend in statistics, numerous factors may also impact data gathered from the CSEW. For example, a combination of increased stigmatisation and more severe penalties may result in surveyants becoming less forthcoming with respect to substance use over time - particularly given that those collecting the data are heavily associated with the government responsible for imposing tougher sanctions. 

Furthermore, whilst the aim of current policy is to reduce all substance use, the ideal outcome from a harm reduction perspective is to address the usage of Class A substances which, according to the Misuse of Drugs act, carry a greater risk of harm. Had such an approach been successful, the expectation would be that serious harm, including substance-related deaths, would decrease in line with the perceived fall of substance usage. This is not the case. 

Figure 22: Deaths related to drug poisoning in England and Wales. Source: Office for National Statistics. 

Instead, as can be observed from figure 22, the rate of drug poisoning deaths registered in 2021 was 81.1 percent higher than in 2012. 

Following Dame Carol Black’s independent report on the approach to and provisions for people that use substances, the government announced ‘From Harm to Hope’, a new ten-year strategy designed to “tackle drugs and prevent crime”. A welcome component of this strategy involves a record £780 million investment into rebuilding the drug treatment system. The strategy also indicates a potential shift towards imposing civil penalties rather than legal sanctions for people that use substances.

Furthermore, the Commission on Race and Ethnic Disparities has previously noted that, for various reasons, this criminalisation has disproportionately affected young people, particularly those from minority ethnic and deprived backgrounds. From Harm to Hope is therefore likely to positively impact such groups more significantly if the use of out of court disposals (OOCD) scheme is properly and consistently implemented. However, alongside this shift towards support rather than punishment, the Government also announced a White Paper set to explore the introduction of more severe sanctions for those who are repeatedly found in possession of controlled substances. The report notes that “nothing is off the table” with the suggestion that curfews, temporary removal of identification documents, and increased fines may constitute this harsher approach. These suggestions were later fleshed out in the ‘Swift, Certain, Tough: New Consequences for Drug Possession’ White Paper, and now include the possibility of an exclusion order from certain venues or geographical areas. 

How do you respond to those found in position? This is the $10 million question. A 1980 study from Critelli & Crawford examining reoffending rates for individuals convicted of a range of offences found that “subjects receiving a fine had a higher probability of future crime than those receiving no punishment”. This also scaled with the severity of the sanction, with those receiving “a comparatively severe fine” having a higher likelihood of recidivism than those receiving fines which were small compared with the suggested fine for that crime. Data from the Ministry of Justice for the 2019/20 shows that, whilst the proven reoffending rate for those who are fined is lower than several other types of sanctions, those receiving only a caution were shown to have both the lowest reoffending rate and the lowest average number of re-offences per person.

In the specific context of substance use recidivism, Alexeev & Weatherburn published a study in 2022 exploring the effect of fines on reoffending rates for re-offences of any type, use/possession re-offences for any drug, and use/possession re-offences for the same drug involved in the original offence. For each of these dependent variables, the use of fines as a sanction increased the likelihood of reoffending, although by a statistically negligible amount.  

Figure 25: Fine and reoffending in 0-2 years: main estimates. Source: Alexeev & Weatherburn, 2022.  

Unhelpfully, the evidence for the efficacy of fines as a deterrent for substance use is limited. We have a drug problem in the United Kingdom, particularly in Scotland but a problem throughout. The solutions to this in the context of tackling crime are not straight forward. We need some honesty about this if we are to tackle this issue. Let me know what you think needs to happen.

Kids are now back at school, hurray - but some children will not last a full year… some might not even last the term. I remember during my time in Downing Street having two very interesting meetings. The first was with the then head of Ofsted - the school inspection body. She said that she did not believe there was a clear correlation between school exclusions and the criminal justice system. I then met with the the head of the Met Police, who said the correlation was clear. So who was right?

I’m afraid the evidence I have seen shows that the correlation is very clear. Perhaps, the the head of Ofsted was trying to articulate that the issues that lead to a child’s exclusion are often things that most schools are not equipped to deal with and/or responsible for. Therefore, the exclusion in and of itself is not the cause - and that a child’s outcomes are unlikely to change even if they are allowed to remain in a school. Others within a class are the ones that suffer. Whilst I can appreciate this position, particularly with the challenges teachers face on a daily basis - we should all be afforded the opportunity of the full context before coming to conclusions on this important subject. Which you will hopefully receive now. Let me know what you think of the below…

The National Education Union (NEU) notes that whilst “there can be no dispute that schools must do all they can to ensure the safety of learning environments”, there is little evidence that zero tolerance approaches to discipline in schools engenders positive behavioural outcomes. On the contrary, uses of these systems “have had a highly negative and exclusionary impact on black students and on students with SEND and on FSM” and “may boost the school-to-prison-pipeline”. Instead, the NEU makes several recommendations that can be grouped into four broad categories. 

Approaches to disruptive behaviour: schools should implement a graduated system which corresponds sanctions to the severity of behaviour. 

Constructive practice: the first recommendation should be introduced alongside initiatives that seek to rebuild the school bond for students at risk of behaviour problems or violence such as restorative justice programmes. 

Multi-agency working: efforts should be concentrated on improving collaboration between schools, parents, youth offending teams, and mental health professionals to develop early interventions and alternatives to isolation and zero tolerance.

Learning and development: schools should invest in continuing professional development for staff to develop trauma informed practice and an understanding of the impact of adverse childhood experiences (ACEs).

Reducing exclusions for minority ethnic children 

It is a known quantity that ethnic diversity amongst teachers is severely limited across Britain. At present, 70.5 percent of the working age population is white British. For the teacher workforce, this figure is 85.1 percent. Furthermore, the Hamilton Commission of 2021 found that 45 percent of schools in England had no racially diverse teachers at all. This disparity is even more concentrated at the senior levels of the education sector. 92.7 percent of headteachers are white British, 0.2 percent are black African, and 0.7 percent are black Caribbean. Experts argue that increasing the ethnic diversity of school teachers will provide role models for minority ethnic children and support increased educational attainment. 

Whilst there is little domestic research available about the impact of diverse teaching staff on the exercise of disciplinary action against students, a recent study based in the USA indicates positive results. Two key findings: First, “greater racial and ethnic diversity on district teaching faculties was associated with a reduction in suspension disparities. As such, increasing representation in the teacher workforce may support a reduction in “inequitable imposition of social control in schools”. Second,”as racial and ethnic teacher diversity increased, the threatening environment that is often associated with higher percentages of minority school students was mitigated, which in turn decreased racial and ethnic suspension disparities”.

This research builds on a body of literature in the USA which also suggests improving representation can engender positive outcomes for minority ethnic students. There are findings which indicate that “student disciplinary outcomes are less severe when they are assigned to a teacher of the same race or ethnicity”, which suggests that severe sanctions such as suspensions or exclusions might be metered out less frequently with increased ethnic diversity amongst teachers. Downey and Pribesh also showed that “when the teacher’s race matches that of the student, they had more improved perceptions of their behaviour”, confirming that the perception of bad behaviour could be amplified by a lack of diversity in the workforce. Finally, another study found that “greater board diversity at the district level decreases punitiveness in schools”, which could suggest that local governing boards, as well as senior leadership teams and the wider teacher workforce could be areas of focus with respect to ethnic diversity in schools. 

There is a clear lack of diversity in teaching and clear benefits to addressing this challenge. However, recent research by the National Foundation for Educational Research (NFER) has demonstrated that the lack of representation across the profession is unlikely to be caused by a lack of engagement from minority ethnic groups. Rather, Asian, black, mixed/multiethnic, and other minority ethnic groups are all overrepresented within applications to initial teacher training (ITT). What follows is a stark drop from this stage through to enrollment in ITT. This downward trend continues onwards as seniority increases. 

Figure 17: Over/under representation of ethnic groups at different stages in the teaching profession. Source: National Foundation for Education Research.

Evidence shows that it is not that people from minority ethnic groups do not want to become teachers. Despite an overrepresentation of Asian, black, mixed/multi-ethnic, and other minority ethnic groups in applications to postgraduate ITT courses, acceptance rates vary significantly. 66 percent of people from white ethnic backgrounds have their applications accepted at this stage, compared to 57 percent of mixed/multiethnic applicants, 53 percent of Asian applicants, and 45 percent of applicants from black and other ethnic groups. These gaps have narrowed considerably between 2013/14 and 2019/20, and are smaller in London than in other areas, which indicate some progress over time. However, these disparities remain unexplained and must be examined if representation in the teaching profession is to improve. The NFER has urged the leaders of ITT providers to make two key changes. Firstly, they recommend that each provider review their recruitment and selection processes to understand why these disparities exist and remove barriers to entry for minority ethnic applicants “at this crucial first stage of entry into the profession”. Secondly, larger educational organisations (such as colleges, recruitment and supply agencies, professional development providers, multi-academy trusts, and ITT providers) are encouraged to commit to publishing institutional data on diversity and acting to address disparities. 

Whilst these initiatives would be welcome additions, this leaves a gap in terms of accountability. The above analysis illustrates that, to an extent, ITT providers are already failing to ensure that increased diversity is supported over time. In addition to the recent reform to the Quality Requirements for ITT providers, the Government should introduce a requirement to the accreditation for ITT providers which mandates enhanced commitment to equal opportunities. This could be achieved through the regular review of recruitment and selection data and the introduction of corrective action when analysis shows disparities in outcome (subject to an agreed tolerance). 

Reducing exclusions for children with SEN 

The most recently available data on permanent exclusions for school shows that the most common reason for expulsion is ‘permanent disruptive behaviour’. 

Figure 18: Reasons cited for permanent exclusions during the academic year 2020/21. Source: Office for National Statistics. 

As can be observed from figure 18, 29.65 percent of exclusions were attributed to this factor in the academic year 2020/21. In spite of this fact, there does not appear to be a standardised definition across the school system. The Child Mind Institute argues that disruptive behaviour is often misdiagnosed and that “in many cases, disruptive, even explosive behavior stems from anxiety or frustration that may not be apparent to parents or teachers”. This type of behaviour may stem from additional needs associated with conditions such as anxiety disorders, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), sensory processing problems, or other learning disorders. Charity I CAN has previously argued that children with speech and language challenges “are noted as having behaviour problems” all too often. However, given that data for suspensions and permanent exclusions indicate a significantly higher rate of segregative sanction for children with identified SEN, whether through statement or EHC plan, it may be that the driver for said disparity is not inability to identify such challenges in children. Rather, it may be the inability to address the underlying cause of perceived behavioural challenges which results in the over-exclusion of disabled children and children with SEN from the education system; that is to say that vulnerable children’s needs are not being met. 

The Timpson Review of 2019 identified a number of studies which used qualitative methods to explore the experiences of autistic young people and their parents in and with the education system.

For example, a study with the National Autistic Society found both parent and child report a gradual decline in enthusiasm for the school system which deteriorated into hatred and resentment. This was attributed to schools either not appreciating or meeting the children’s needs. Such findings were consistent with those who spoke to parents of excluded children in London in 2015, finding a general sentiment amongst participants that mainstream schools “lacked the staff expertise, financial resources and time to accommodate pupils with additional needs”. Additionally, qualitative interviews with young autistic women and their parents in 2017, saw several themes emerging: schools were described as ‘impersonal’ and ‘inappropriate’ environments due to inappropriate peers, sensory processing difficulties and other pressures; challenges in communication and establishing positive staff or peer relationships; perceptions of inadequate understanding of needs amongst staff; and insufficient long-term support. 

These sentiments are largely reflected in the Ofsted-Care Quality Commission (CQC) SEND inspections carried out between 2016 and 2021, in which a substantial proportion of schools were required to produce a written statement of action (WSoA) detailing plans to improve. In its evaluation report, the Government stated that the results of said inspections were “an indication of significant weaknesses in the local areas’ SEND arrangements.”. 

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Figure 19: proportion of local areas for which the SEND inspection resulted in the need for a WSoA. Source:Ofsted. 

As can be observed from figure 19, just over half (51 percent) of local areas inspected in this five year period were deemed to require improvement in their provision of support for children with special educational needs and disabilities (SEND). The same report also appears to suggest that outcomes have become proportionately worse over time, excluding 2018-19 which saw the largest proportion of local areas (64 percent) receiving an unfavourable result. In 2022, data indicated that 76 out of 141 inspections had resulted in a WSoA. Inspection results have also varied significantly by region, with London seeing the lowest proportion of areas requiring a WSoA, followed by the East Midlands region. Conversely, the East of England region saw the highest proportion of areas requiring a WSoA, followed by North East, Yorkshire and Humber. 

There are clear shortfallings of SEND provision at both the local and national levels, with quality of care and service provision as well as level funding consistently being highlighted as challenges. It is beyond the scope of this report to fully address the crisis currently gripping SEND provision and there is much work happening at the national level to support a redress of the system. However, examples of good practice offer hope for reducing the disproportionate rates of exclusions for children with SEND and, by extension, their exposure to CCE in lieu of a solution to the wider systemic issues referenced above. In recognition of the inequity and danger in such a situation persisting, agencies across Southwark, including the council, schools, colleges, health services, and safeguarding partnership agencies across the borough have produced the Southwark Inclusion Charter 2021. This document sets out the shared approach, principles, and commitments made by the respective signatories with “a recognition that permanent exclusion from education can have a significant negative impact on the wellbeing of children and their future”. Furthermore, one of the key commitments is that each agency, where appropriate, “will take a trauma-informed approach to behaviour of concern in children[...] not taking concerning behaviour at face value, but striving to understand what is driving that behaviour”. This is set against the acknowledgement that “there are rare instances where exclusion is unavoidable to safeguard children”. Such a document provides the terms of reference for a renewed commitment to limiting the damage done to children through exclusion, and should be adopted by local authorities across the country. The Southwark Inclusion Charter follows an exemplary record on exclusions, having reduced this number from 49 in 2017-18 to 36 in 2018-19 and further to 10 in 2020-21 through partnership working. 

In light of the recent Wayne Couzens, Hussain Chehab, and David Carrick cases, it is clear that further action is required. These are not isolated incidents and nor are they confined to particular regions or police forces. Every instance of such behaviour does substantial damage to both the reputation of the police service and the confidence the public holds in its ability to uphold high legal, moral and professional standards.

HMICFRS’ recent report ‘An inspection of vetting, misconduct, and misogyny in the police service’ highlighted a number of high profile incidents which demonstrate what has been described as “failure to learn lessons”. Having examined a number of areas including recruitment, vetting, reporting and sanctioning of misogynistic and predatory behaviour, and internal procedures for gathering and managing intelligence, the report made 43 recommendations across five areas for improvement.  

One of the critical areas of concern highlighted by HMICFRS was the vetting process for police personnel. As part of the review, a sample of 725 vetting files were inspected. These comprised 548 recruitment vetting (RV) files and 177 transferee or re-joiner files; no management vetting (MV) files were inspected. The team responsible for evaluating these decisions unanimously disagreed with 68 (9.4 percent) decisions in total. A further 63 cases were identified for which the team felt insufficient detail was available to corroborate a decision.

Whilst it was noted in the report that the small sample size and the methodology of the vetting file review meant that “it would not be appropriate to presume any statistical significance from these figures”, the relatively large number of decisions which HMICFRS could not endorse is still cause for concern. A number of the cases highlighted found “officers and staff with criminal records, or suspicions that they had committed crime (including some serious crime), substantial undischarged debt, or family members linked to organised crime”. In others, there was evidence that “officers and staff had given false or incomplete information to the vetting unit”.

The recommendations I make will, if adopted, undoubtedly make the processes for vetting more robust. However, given the historical failures of forces to ensure that those who would abuse the powers delegated to police officers and staff, it is recommended that HMICFRS maintains considerable scrutiny and oversight of such decisions for the foreseeable future. It is recommended that HMICFRS reviews a sample of 10 percent of all appointments per police force on an annual basis, screening for appropriateness and consistency. This should continue until a satisfactory reduction in decisions deemed inappropriate. Doing so protects both the public and the reputation of the police in the long term. 

In addition to the overall efficacy of the vetting process, the report highlighted “a growing consensus” that currently renewal periods for vetting are too long. At present, guidance for such intervals provided by the College of Policing, known as Vetting Authorised Personnel (Vetting APP) recommends renewal for MV every seven years and renewal for RV every ten years. The Harris Review 2022 also highlighted this as a concern, calling for an increase in police resources to facilitate full renewal vetting checks at least every three years. This recommendation, in part, was endorsed by HMICFRS who stated “there does not appear to be strong evidence to say exactly what the renewal period should be”, but that “shorter renewal periods would be more appropriate”. As such, recommendation 14 of their report is that “by October 31 2023, the College of Policing, in consultation with the National Police Chiefs’ Council lead for vetting, should change the Vetting Authorised Professional Practice to prescribe intervals substantially shorter than ten and seven years for the renewal of recruitment vetting and management vetting respectively.”.

Also of concern is HMICFRS’ findings that, within one force over a 12 month period, half of all misconduct proceedings against police officers involved an officer in their first two years of service. This, coupled with the significant influx of recruits to the police service as a result of the Police Uplift Programme, means that the contemporary inadequacy of vetting procedures poses a significant risk of future misconduct. As such, it is recommended that police officers are subject to an annual renewal of vetting for the first two years of their service. Whilst both the Harris Review 2022 and HMICFRS’ report recognise that the introduction of more regular checks would be resource intensive, both also argue that the context within which such changes have been proposed make them justifiable. Equally, it provides further weight to the notion that future investment in police forces should include business support and administrative functions as core competencies of the service.

No matter how rigorous the vetting process, it cannot be considered a panacea for preventing police corruption. As noted by HMICFRS in their report, “Vetting can be viewed as a safety net, but an imperfect one. There will always be a danger of unsuitable applicants slipping through.”

There must also be robust controls to ensure that transgressions committed either by police officers or personnel of the police are dealt with effectively. At present, the Police Reform Act 2002 and the Police (Conduct) Regulations 2020 stipulates that behaviour which presents cause for concern must be referred to a chief officer who performs the role of appropriate authority (AA).

Under these prescriptions, the chief officer may delegate this responsibility to a suitably qualified officer who must be of inspector rank or higher; this is a widely adopted practice. The final decision if a case is to be investigated and to what extent falls to this AA. Therefore individuals operating in this capacity act as gatekeepers for whether an allegation or concern is treated as misconduct, gross misconduct, or is dealt with through procedures of lesser severity such as the reflective practice review process. In principle, there is nothing wrong with this approach. In practice, HMICFRS found evidence that “initial assessments by some appropriate authorities reveal leniency, apathy and too much tolerance of prejudicial and improper behaviour”. For the majority of the 236 cases assessed during the review, decision-making was found to be of appropriate standards. However, five case studies highlighted evidenced decisions that could have serious consequences for vulnerable people. For example, in 2021 a male officer on patrol, unsolicited, showed a female colleague an explicit image in which his genitals were exposed. This was recorded by the AA as misconduct rather than gross misconduct, thereby precluding the possibility of dismissal as a consequence.

HMICFRS notes that this is inconsistent with examples of other comparable cases. In another case study from 2021, a male officer met a female burglary victim at her home and subsequently contacted her using his personal Whatsapp account to request a date. A complaint was made and, while the AA involved recognised such behaviour as potential abuse of position for sexual purpose (AoPSP), the situation was assessed as ‘misconduct only’ and was not referred to the Independent Office for Police Conduct (IOPC). The report lists a number of other examples following the same or  similar themes. There is too much at stake in such situations for decisions of this nature to be allocated to one person, and the inconsistencies highlighted here are evidence that the current approach is not working.

Officers, or members of staff, who pose a risk to vulnerable people must be subject to an investigation commensurate with their behaviour. As such, it is recommended that AAs are replaced with appropriate authority panels (AAPs) comprising a minimum of three people, one of which is independent of the investigating force. At this point, it is important to note that being subject to a higher-level investigation does not automatically result in more severe consequences; professional standards departments (PSDs) may reassess cases at their discretion. However, ensuring that cases of gross misconduct are identified properly in the first instance and investigated as such will support an improvement of police culture in three key ways. Firstly, it will build the analytical capability of forces by ensuring that personnel’s professional standards histories are accurate. Secondly, it will mitigate the risk of harm to vulnerable people by ensuring that sanctioning decisions are proportionate to the severity of personnel’s behaviour. Thirdly, it will encourage people to come forward with crucial anti-corruption intelligence. As noted in the report, “overly lenient assessments undermine staff confidence, discourage the reporting of wrongdoing and harm the police service’s reputation”; forces’ ability to identify and address inappropriate behaviour is contingent upon disclosure.

Who to Manage and How

Some offenders are more problematic than others, both in terms of the volume and levels of harm caused by their actions. Building on a substantial body of literature. Recent research by Liggins, Ratcliffe and Bland has shown that “there is potential to target a small number of repeat offenders for harm reduction strategies” using crime severity metrics such as the Cambridge Crime Harm Index (CCHI) in addition to the volume of crime. The study, evaluating data sourced from Northamptonshire Police Force against the CCHI, found that “80% of crime harm that is identified to an offender is linked to a felonious few of just 7% of all detected offenders”. 

Figure 14: Proportion of identified offenders responsible for 20%, 50%, and 80% of cumulative offender identified crime harm, by year. Source: Liggins, Ratcliffe, & Bland, 2019. 

Consistent with previous studies by Bland and Ariel and Barham et al., the study concluded that with each event, the likelihood of a subsequent offence becomes more likely. For first time offences, the event shows a 37 percent likelihood of a second offence. By the twelfth event, the conditional probability exceeds 88 percent. However, the scale of harm engendered by each event also tends to decrease with each offence. This ultimately results in a 95 percent turnover rate for the most harmful offenders year-on-year. In terms of policy implications, this suggests that earlier intervention which seeks to understand and address the root cause of the criminal behaviour is critical to offender management. However, this is contingent upon more police forces utilising multi-year analyses of crime data to understand how their offender base is segmented. As noted in the study, “the question of offender management time is a critical resource issue”, irrespective of who does it - police, probation, or even the prison system. However, “the present analysis could be profitably undertaken in every police force in England and Wales and refreshed annually or even more frequently” to the benefit of society. 

Crime as a Diverse Public Health Problem

There is mounting evidence that solutions to recidivism cannot be applied as one-size–fits-all and must be tailored by demography. This is also informed by the idea that crime is more closely related with health and its wider social determinants than it is with individual proclivity towards deviance. In 2018, the Ministry of Justice (MoJ) released a report concerning emerging evidence that a whole system approach (WSA) is required to support female offenders and prevent reoffending in this demographic. This was rooted in evidence that women “can have poorer outcomes and distinct issues which require a tailored approach”. Female prisoners are more than twice as  likely than male prisoners to report needing help for mental health problems (49% and 18% respectively). Furthermore, female prisoners are more likely to report having been taken into care, experienced abuse, and witnessed violence  in the home as a child. Imprisoned mothers are also more likely to be living with their children prior to being taken into custody (around 60% of women compared to roughly 45% of men). These disparities may be partly rooted in wider social factors such as men being less likely to disclose mental health needs. However, that does not diminish the fact that this segment of the prison population has distinct needs which require specific solutions. There is also evidence to suggest that being sent to prison has significant negative outcomes for women in particular, with the rate of self-harm for female prisoners being nearly five times higher than for male prisoners, for example. As such, the WSA seeks to find solutions which prevent incarceration where a positive alternative can be found. 

Case Study: WSA in Greater Manchester

The intervention was introduced in 2014 for women offenders and women at risk of offending in Greater Manchester. The project aimed to provide gender-responsive approaches for women across Greater Manchester at three key points in the CJS: at the point of arrest, sentence, and release from custody. A multi-agency approach supported the delivery of the project, with a network of nine women’s centres (“the Alliance”) working closely with a number of key CJS agencies. 

Women were referred to one of the women’s centres which acted as a ‘one-stop-shop’ for their needs, dealing with a range of issues including mental health and wellbeing, domestic abuse, finance and debt, accommodation, substance misuse, physical health and children and family. 

In every area of need, at least 70% of the service users had their need met or some progress made whilst being supported by the Alliance. Additionally, whilst the MoJ report notes it cannot be concluded that “the WSA has had a direct impact, there has been a reduction in the number of adult women arrested, prosecuted and in the number sentenced to custodial sentences in GM (Greater Manchester) since 2014. This amounted to:

• A 13.5 percent proven re-offending rate compared to 24.3% in England and Wales (January-March 2021)

• A 45 percent decrease of adult women arrested in Greater Manchester between 2014/15-2016/17

• A 17 percent decrease of adult women prosecuted between 2014/2015-2016/2017

• A 40 percent decrease in the number of adult women sentenced to immediate custody since 2014

Whilst these results are tentative, they suggest that approaching criminal behaviour as a matter of public health and using prison as a last resort (where appropriate alternatives exist) may yield significant benefits to vulnerable community members.

Another demographic which has been recognised as needing a tailored approach is children and young people. As with the approach developed for women, it is argued that “custody should be a last resort in dealing with offending behaviour in young people” Public Health England identifies a number of risk factors which increase the likelihood of offending and reoffending, including 

Individual risk factors:

• Early malnutrition

• Behavioural risk factors

• Alcohol or drug misuse

• Traumatic brain injury

• Language difficulties

Family risk factors:

• Abuse

• Emotional or physical neglect

• Household alcohol or drug misuse, mental illness, or offending

• Family violence or breakdown

School and peer group risk factors:

• Poor educational attainment

• Truancy

• Exclusion from school

• Gang membership

• Low expectations from teachers

Community risk factors:

• Deprivation

• Poor housing

• Unsafe areas

• Poor social mobility

• High crime rate

• High unemployment

• Racism
  

As can be observed, there are a substantial amount of risk factors for criminal behaviour in children and young people, each of which requires its own set of interventions with corresponding evaluations. These are complex problems which truly require a multi-agency approach if progress is to be made in protecting children from exposure to crime and, in turn, both the Youth Justice System (YJS) and the Criminal Justice System (CJS). Many of these risk factors also speak to a deeply inequitable society, with social challenges such as deprivation, poor housing, and high crime rate being distributed unevenly amongst ethnic groups in society. 

In terms of interventions which have already been trialled, one of the most successful approaches is a police-led diversion scheme where officers seek to use cautions instead of arrests, restorative actions, and referrals to other supportive services where appropriate. A systematic review of studies into police-led diversion programmes by Wilson, Brennan, and Olaghere found that the odds ratio for reoffending in diverted youth compared to youth experiencing traditional processing was 0.77, indicating a significant decrease in reoffending rates. 

Two key factors can be observed in common with the above approaches. Firstly, interventions which seek to prevent offending and reoffending often impact more significantly when criminal behaviour is approached as a matter of public health. Secondly, successful approaches tend to focus on diverting people away from the CJS which, in many cases, has been proven to be harmful to vulnerable groups. 

School exclusions as a key site for risk

In taking a preventative approach to crime, limiting exposure to criminal behaviour and child criminal exploitation (CCE) should be a focus for the government. School exclusions in particular are starkly inequitable and expensive, both at the economic and human cost level. There are a number of ethnic groups who are excluded either significantly more or significantly less than white British pupils. 

Figure 15: Ethnic groups with a higher rate of permanent exclusions and suspensions than white British school children Autumn term 2021/22. Source: Office for National Statistics.

The same is true for children eligible for free school meals (FSM) and children with special educational needs, whether or not they have been provided with an education and health care (EHC) plan. 

Figure 16: Exclusion and suspension rates by FSM eligibility and SEN provision. Source Office for National Statistics.

Just for Kids Law notes that exclusions are often engineered by exploiters, who victims into carrying drugs or weapons into school which often leads to exclusion. Furthermore, exclusion from school, whether on a temporary or permanent basis substantially increases the likelihood of a child’s exposure to (further) CCE. The 2017-18 annual report released by His Majesty’s Chief Inspector of Prisons for England and Wales noted that a staggering 89 percent of children in custody reported exclusion from school. It is of particular concern that the most recent annual report has not reexamined this figure. This should become a recurrent feature in every annual report by His Majesty’s Chief Inspector of Prisons for England and Wales. The 2018-2019 iteration indicated that 53 percent of children held in secure training centres and youth offender institutions were from a black and minority ethnic background, compared to 18.3 percent of the national population. This has been described by The Institute of Race Relations, amongst others, as the Pupil Referral Unit (PRU)-to-Prison-Pipeline (PPP). Originally developed in the United States of America as the Schools-to-Prison-Pipeline (SPP), the concept describes how the disproportionate exclusion of particular demographic groups reproduces the punitive paradigm of the prison system and criminalises young people of certain backgrounds. It can also be observed that the overrepresentation of children eligible for FSM or with SEN translates into the YJS. Whilst available data is less recent, 44% of those sentenced to less than 12 months in custody in the academic year 2012/2013 were known to be eligible for FSM. 45% were recorded as having SEN without a statement and 28% with a statement.  

Digital Infrastructure

One issue in particular which has been consistently highlighted as problematic is the lack of a shared national digital infrastructure between police forces. ‘A New Force’, a report published by Reform in 2009, noted that such a fragmented approach has historically stymied the effectiveness of intelligence sharing and resulted in inefficiencies in police spending. The report identified that “there is no single IT system that forces can use. The 43 forces pay 43 times to develop 43 different IT systems”. Forces which had proactively addressed this situation had evidenced significant cost savings through economies of scale and resource sharing. The police forces for Kent and Essex had taken a collaborative approach to procurement and generated savings of £2.8 million between 2007 and the report’s publication. In addition, Avon & Somerset and Gloucestershire police forces had pooled resources to purchase a helicopter which would not have been financially viable had each force acted alone. 

In 2012, Nick Herbert, the then Minister for Policing and Criminal Justice noted that “there are 2,000 systems between the 43 forces of England and Wales, and individual forces have not always driven the most effective deals”.This was to be addressed by the Police ICT Company (now the Police Digital Service), a bespoke body jointly owned by the Association of Police Authorities and the Home Office. However, in 2021, an inspection of the regional organised crime units (ROCUs) found that, despite having “good access to intelligence” and performing well, these units “had to work with multiple intelligence systems in different forces”. These issues meant that “the process for exchanging some sensitive intelligence was inefficient, mainly due to limitations in technology”. In some instances, “hard copies of intelligence reports are still being moved across the country”, a situation which was described as unacceptable. HMICFRS concluded that “more needs to be done to improve digital access across the network and other agencies”. The above evidence suggests that, despite efforts to overhaul and improve the digital infrastructure available to police forces and other designated law enforcement units, significant challenges persist which call for further investment and development. 

Encouragingly, the challenges brought by disparate systems have been acknowledged in its National Policing Digital Strategy 2020-2030, noting that key actions will be to “invest in common connected technology development to benefit from economies of scale” and “adopt digital technologies[...]to deliver more targeted and digital supported interventions to prevent harm, across forces and with partners, in a streamlined and efficient manner”.

However, there are a number of issues previously highlighted which the National Policing Digital Strategy does not address. These are very basic challenges, such as adequate access to hardware, which prevent police officers and staff from being able to undertake their duties and function effectively. The 2018 CPaCC National Police ICT Survey highlighted significant discontent amongst police personnel, having received 3,980 responses. Two key results from officers and staff are displayed below: 

• 55 percent were dissatisfied with their force’s overall ICT provision

• 65 percent said they were able to access a computer when needed

• 51 percent said their force can provide a mobile data device fit for purpose if needed

This can be observed on both the national scale and within the Metropolitan Police; the Met Survey May 2022 showed that just 49 percent of those who responded felt they had technology to use that makes their job easier. Insufficiency of resources in purely quantitative terms may also be compounded by the influx of officers recruited throughout the Police Uplift Programme. The National Digital Policing Strategy 2020-2030 will surely be a welcome response to many long-standing issues with the digital infrastructure available to forces. However, if challenges such as the above, like not being able to access a computer or mobile device when necessary, are not resolved, then the investment may not engender the positive results it aims to achieve. It is therefore recommended that the Home Office works collaboratively with police forces at the local level to complete a national audit of available hardware to ensure that, in tandem with the upgrades provided by the PDS, officers and staff are able to access the technology required to fulfil their duties.

Merging Smaller Forces

In 2005, His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) presented a report to the Home Secretary which concerned whether the 43 force structure was “the right one to meet the challenges posed by the current and future policing environment”. The principal aim of the report was to establish how the structure of police forces might be adapted in order to “provide effective and sustainable protective services to a common standard in future”. 

One of the key issues identified was that forces below a certain size tended, though not without exception, to perform worse than forces with 4,000 officers or more. As previously discussed in this report, part of this problem stems from the fact that discrete forces tend to operate discrete systems for matters such as IT, HR, payroll, and intelligence, thus generating the need to dedicate substantial resources 43 times over. Additionally, the report noted that multiple components of protective services cause severe surges in spending which in turn placed significant financial burdens on forces. Smaller forces were typically less financially resilient and therefore “much more likely to apply for special grants”.

At the time of the report’s publication, it was estimated that savings generated through potential mergers could amount to £70 million in one year, with additional productivity gains of up to £250 million being realised in subsequent years. A range of analyses were considered, amounting to net present values (NPVs) of between £560 million and £2.25 billion. As such, the business case for consolidating smaller forces is well evidenced, particularly given the ongoing move for efficiency in policing. 

However, it was not simply the business case which underpinned the need to establish a “more efficient, integrated operating platform above BCU level”. Performance on level 2 measures such as counter-terrorism, domestic extremism, serious and organised crime, and public order was generally higher for larger forces.

Figure 13: Overall trend for protective services - force size versus inspectorate score. Source: HMIC. 

Much of the challenge inherent in redefining the 43 police force structure originates from the seemingly competing priorities of local, regional, and national policing. As noted in the report, “the organisation of service delivery must be on a scale large enough to respond dynamically, but local enough to understand the diverse context within which it operates”. The report acknowledged the findings of the National Reassurance Policing Project of 2002 that “people identified strongly with an identifiable, named local officer”. Although, importance was also afforded to the contingent of people who valued links at the country/supra-county level. Ultimately, it was felt that reform of the 43 police force structure was possible whilst maintaining the neighbourhood policing presence so valued by local communities. In part, this involved providing reassurance “that local arrangements - ie at BCU and neighbourhood level - will not change”.The report put forward several potential solutions for this reform which would need to account for the size, mix of capabilities, criminal markets, geography, risk, coterminosity, and identity. 

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1. Collaboration

HMIC noted that this option was less favourable, largely due to significant problems having been observed with force collaboration up until the point of the report’s publication. In particular, the report acknowledged challenges with governance, performance, and accountability which would, at best “be complex, slow and of limited impact”. This may have changed since the publication of the report and bears revisiting as a potential option.

2. Lead force for specialist capabilities

This option would see forces merged with ‘partners’ being reallocated to certain types of crime. Whilst this option was felt to be viable “in theory, and with funding”, HMIC noted that it would not necessarily overcome more fundamental issues identified in its work to date. Furthermore, this option would have “significant implications for smaller forces in relation to the control and direction of enquiries conducted within their own borders”. 

3. Lead regional force

In this scenario, forces would build upon existing infrastructure, processes and partnership arrangements. One force within an association of chief police officers (ACPO) region would be resourced as the lead force to host personnel, finance and logistics of the regional protective services requirements on behalf of other partners. This could potentially address the inefficiencies identified within the disparate back office arrangements of the 43 force structure. However, HMIC also noted that this could engender challenges with integration, accountability, and the perception that ACPO regions are “artificial entities”.

4. Federation of forces

Under this arrangement, forces below HMIC’s accepted standard could self-reform to be unified entities. Federations would utilise a common set of protective services with the potential to brigade support services. This option presents the key advantage of balancing local, regional, and national priorities as local policing, including BCU, would be preserved. However, the major barrier to this option is that impetus for pursuing federation is the concerned forces’ dissatisfaction for the status quo. Federation also suffers from similar issues to options 1 and 3 in that there may be confusion over priorities, accountability, and governance. 

5. Strategic forces 

This option would require the most significant degree of reform and therefore would require leadership, extensive support, and national will. The redevelopment of the current 43 force structure would see forces regrouped against the aforementioned factors of size, criminality, and geography. HMIC described this option for reform as “the clearest and most business-like”, with the potential to enact a prescriptive reform approach. This would, however, be contingent upon the appointment of a new executive and strategic authority being appointed at an early stage which may require substantial investment upfront. 

Whilst local policing arrangements would not be disrupted whilst force level services were rationalised, HMIC notes that this approach could be perceived as “disruptive and least ‘locally friendly’. 

Ultimately, it was concluded that “the 43 force structure is no longer fit for purpose” and that “in the interests of the efficiency and effectiveness of policing it should change”. HMIC’s recommendation at the time was that the strategic forces approach to reform would offer the best business solution.

Whilst the Labour Government accepted this report and introduced proposals for reform in 2006, they were ultimately rejected in the face of strong opposition. Successive governments have since “rejected arguments for compulsory top-down mergers, urging greater collaboration instead”. This potentially follows the 2012 report from HMIC titled ‘Increasing efficiency in the Police Service’, which examined the potential benefits of greater collaboration between forces in lieu of more radical reform. Referenced previously, one of the examples of this increased collaboration between forces are ROCUs. The 2021 ‘State of Policing’ report notes that “the ROCU network had made substantial progress in some respects, particularly in cyber-crime and undercover policing”. In spite of this, the fragmented nature of the 43 force structure still acts a barrier in other areas, with significant inconsistencies having been observed throughout England and Wales in the “resourcing, leadership and operation of ROCUs”.

There are also more recent advocates for reform of this nature. In 2020, Martin Hewitt, Chair of the National Police Chiefs Council, urged the Government to initiate a review as part of its wider overhaul of the criminal justice system. This idea has also been supported by Sir Mark Rowley, Dame Cressida Dick, the Police Federation of England and Wales, and the Police Superintendents Association. Ultimately, this demonstrates that whilst there may have previously been significant outcry at the prospect of reform, such attitudinal obstacles may have since been abated. Presently, the approach of the government is aligned to its 2019 manifesto, which included:

• Increasing police powers

• Devolutionist policy which affords powers to city region mayors, Police and Crime Commissioners (PCCs)

• Increasing the strength of police forces across the country 

• Adapting the governance structure of the police, placing greater accountability of PCCs

• Providing police officers with the equipment they need (through initiatives such as the Police Digital Service)

• Judicial reform to legislation such as the Human Rights Act and the Crime and Courts Act

These manifesto commitments address a number of challenges identified throughout our investigation into UK crime statistics, such as the back office inefficiencies discussed previously. However, it remains to be seen whether the level 2 gap caused by the disparate 43-force model and central to HMIC’s 2005 evaluation will be resolved through such commitments. As such, it is recommended that the Home Office commissions a renewed and bespoke evaluation of this service provision, subject to a satisfactory period of implementation of the government’s manifesto commitments on policing.

Alcohol, in particular, is commonly linked to violent crimes. The Office for Health Improvement & Disparities places it as a factor in 40 percent of all violent crimes in England, and Alcohol Change at 39 percent in England and 49 percent in Wales. Not only do such incidents have a significant impact on people’s ability to feel and be safe in their local areas, but they also bear a substantial economic impact.

In 2018, the Home Office estimated the total cost of crime in England and Wales between 2015-2016 to be £50 billion, with violent crime accounting for almost three quarters of this figure. In London, alcohol-related harm accounts for 35 percent of all accident & emergency (A&E) attendances and up to 70 percent of all attendances at peak times over weekends. Furthermore, in 2016 the Metropolitan Police reported that roughly 27 percent of all calls to the police had “an alcohol factor behind them”.

The Police and Crime Committee of the London Assembly have previously noted that statistics relating to alcohol-fuelled crime are limited in reliability as “there is no agreed definition of ‘alcohol-related’ or ‘alcohol-fuelled crime’”. Typically, an alcohol-related violent incident is recorded “where the victim perceived the offender(s) to be under the influence of alcohol at the time of the incident”. The report by the Police and Crime Committee, released in 2016, noted that the Home Office was exploring whether a definition of alcohol-fuelled violence and a national ‘flag’ should be introduced and used in the reporting of crime. However, it appears there has been no change in the definition since. Establishing a definition of this kind could improve analytical capabilities and support police forces to better  target interventions into alcohol-related incidents. As such, it is recommended that the Home Office revisits introducing a specific definition which is less reliant upon subjective factors such as the victim’s perception of an incident.

The College of Policing has collated evidence on a number of initiatives aimed at reducing violence in the NTE which experienced mixed results.or are currently undergoing evaluation. Currently, the evidence summarised which demonstrates positive results can be broken into two categories: increased police presence and other night-time economy interventions. Historically, there have been concerns expressed by police forces that financial retrenchment has restricted their ability to effectively dedicate resources to policing the NTE. For example, in 2016, officers in the Metropolitan Police Force noted that changes in shift patterns were necessary to achieve this goal, with many retained on duty at the end of shifts. The Mayor of London has committed to allocating 500 of the officers recruited during the Police Uplift Programme to forming the new Town Centre Teams, with a further 150 officers being deployed as dedicated ward officers (DWO) in the busiest wards.

Increased Police Presence 

The most recently available evidence for whether increasing police presence has an impact comes from a 2020 systematic review of evidence-based practice by McGuire, Evans, & Kane. Police patrols in the NTE can broadly be divided into targeted and untargeted interventions. The review found that “untargeted measures that heighten office presence in and around licensed premises, as well as increased monitoring of licence law violations” typically produce mixed results with respect to police recorded assaults and violence. 

On the other hand, targeted police involvement involving collaboration with local agencies which focuses on specific licensed presences that have a history of violence problems are more effective. However, case studies which underpin this conclusion, such as the TASC project, were conducted in 2003 and therefore may not fully reflect the conditions of the modern night-time economy.

Multi-level community interventions

Even more effective than targeted and collaborative interventions were approaches that took a holistic approach, involving a number of stakeholders such as licence holders and law enforcement whose objectives were aligned. These programmes are more complex and involve components such as stricter enforcement of licensing laws, community information campaigns, training for bar and door staff, and police engagement of licensees in considering aspects of bar management that can reduce risk factors. 

The evidence for interventions of this type are more recent, with a notable study having been conducted in 2019 by Quigg. Their research examined the Stockholm Prevents Alcohol and Drug Problems (STAD) model and found it to have positive results across a number of settings in mainland Europe. For example, the authors concluded that the model had shown “significant reductions in access, consumption and harms across nightlife settings” as well as positive impacts “across communities surrounding the nightlife setting (e.g. crime reduction)”. Two notable projects involving the STAD model have been undertaken in England and Wales, one in Wrexham and one across Cheshire and Merseyside, both of which yielded positive results. 

Case Study 3: STAD in Wrexham

One such intervention was also trialled in Wrexham, Wales, and concerned attempts to enact behavioural change in multiple stakeholder groups including participants in the night-time economy, licensees, and door and bar staff. The intervention involved:

Community Mobilisation:

• A multi-agency steering group including the local authority (Trading Standards, Licensing, Community safety and Communications), North Wales Police, Public Health Wales, youth services, education, and the Liverpool John Moores University

• Community engagement with licensees, door security personnel, and young people at local educational establishments

• An awareness raising campaign through email, blogs, posters, local and national press, and social media. The campaign covered legislation around the sale and purchase of alcohol for intoxicated people, as well as the vulnerability associated with drinking before going to a venue.

Training:

• Responsible beverage service train the trainer style training provided to licensees and heads of door security on alcohol legislation and vulnerability associated with intoxication

• Training on alcohol vulnerability with captains of university clubs and societies

Enforcement:

• Police engagement with the licensing trade to cultivate self-policing practices, prevent the sale of alcohol to already-intoxicated people, and reinforcement by officers policing nightlife

Outcomes:

The following positive outcomes were observed: 

Figure 11: Percentage of participants who held knowledge of the laws around the service of alcohol to, and the purchase of alcohol for intoxicated people pre (2017) and post-intervention (2018) user survey. Source:Quigg et al., 2019. 

Figure 12: Bar server propensity to refuse alcohol to pseudo-intoxicated actors, pre (2017) and post (2018) alcohol test purchases. Source: Quigg et al., 2019. 

Challenges:

A number of barriers to the successful implementation of the model were identified. The first of which was limited resources, both in terms of finances and staff time, meaning that some of the planned components such as engaging with taxi drivers were not carried out. 

This factor carries over to the second barrier, which was limited high-level (e.g. national) support that meant further resources to deliver ‘drink less, enjoy more’ messages could not be distributed through social media advertising. Thirdly, the tiered training model meant that stakeholders were unable to ascertain whether the training had been cascaded down properly and reached all door and bar staff. Fourthly, in spite of the steering group, there were varying levels of involvement from its members meaning that an operational sub-group comprising three core stakeholders implemented the majority of the intervention. 

Plenary:

Authors of the evaluation for this study noted that the evidence for the effectiveness of this intervention was less potent than those in mainland Europe, “potentially due to intervention fidelity and/or variations in cultural or structural factors between settings”.As such, further implementation and evaluation “is crucial for informing future prevention efforts to address the harmful use of alcohol across European drinking environments”. 

In spite of the barriers faced in delivering the initiative in Wrexham, the model still produced tangible positive results which could contribute to future attempts to address challenges posed by the NTE. However, this is contingent upon addressing the barriers experienced throughout the trial and securing a suitable vehicle for delivering a retrial of the STAD. One such vehicle is the Safer City Partnership (SCP) of London, which is well placed to undertake such a project for several reasons. Firstly, the Square Mile (the key geographical remit of the partnership) was identified by the City of London Corporation to have “a large and growing Night Time Economy, which poses health and safety issues for those who live, learn, work and visit there”. Secondly, according to the same source “levels of alcohol consumption and alcohol related harm for workers in the Square Mile is significantly higher than the England average”. Thirdly, both the City of London Corporation and the SCP (of which the former is a partner) have previously acknowledged and identified these challenges as key priorities in their strategies. Fourthly, the SCP is well positioned to respond to the majority of barriers experienced throughout the initial trial of the STAD model in England and Wales. The partnership has access to revenues derived from the Proceeds of Crime Act (POCA), which it has previously allocated to initiatives attempting to deal with anti-social behaviour (ASB) and improve the extent to which people are safe and feel safe in the night-time economy. This funding could be used to address the under-resourcing which inhibited the fidelity with which the model was implemented. In addition, unlike the steering group organised to oversee the implementation of the Wrexham initiative, the SCP is an established governance structure with well defined ways of working. In conclusion, the SCP should consider utilising revenue derived from POCA seizures to retrial the STAD model in the context of London’s Square Mile.

Throughout his time in Whitehall, Samuel became increasingly aware that he was an outsider. That his own experiences, assumptions and language were so different to many of those he found himself surrounded by in Downing Street.

In this new book Samuel considers who outsiders are, why they are not talked about enough and how it can be a source of strength that leads them to become high achievers. He argues that the success of many great people can be explained by their outsider status.

Drawing on his own experiences in government, growing up and beyond, as well as the stories of other outsiders, famous and lesser known, Samuel shows how outsiders are more likely to be trailblazers and break barriers, how they have a greater sense of perspective and progress and how our differences can be a force for good - in politics and beyond. To purchase The Power of the Outsider click here. 

This autumn Samuel will be embarking on a nationwide book tour, and will be speaking at the Cheltenham Book Festival amongst many other dates. If you are interested in booking Samuel for your organisation email: hello@inclusiveboards.co.uk.

Most people do not really know how Britain has come in relation to disability rights, and the distance still to travel. Futureproof politics has done some digging and today we’re giving you the full picture.

The disability rights movement in the United Kingdom can be traced at least as far back at the late 14th century, wherein the 1388 Statute of Cambridge (otherwise known as ‘Poor Law’) was passed. The statute made the distinction between ‘deserving’ and ‘undeserving’ poor people claiming alms, with disabled and older people being considered ‘deserving’ and therefore being eligible for charity. However, it was not until more recent times that the organisation of disabled people, for disabled people, started to take form. In the late 19th century, the British Deaf Association and the National League of the Blind were established as the first two recorded organisations of disabled people. This was a key development because movements recorded prior to this development can be distinguished as organisations for disabled people, movements which were run by non-disabled people to ‘provide’ for disabled people.  

This laid the groundwork for many future developments, and a timeline of activism that has seen many significant developments in the attitudes towards and treatment of disabled people in the personal, political, and professional spheres.

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The capital city of England is a distinct environment in many ways. It is the largest city in the United Kingdom, with an area of 607 square miles and a population of 8.796 million people, many of which live in the most densely populated areas in the country.

The population is also the most diverse across a range of characteristics. According to the 2021 Census, 36.8 percent of the population in London identified as ‘White: English, Welsh, Scottish, Northern Irish or British’, compared with 81.7 percent of England and Wales as a whole; 25.3 percent identified with a religion other than Christianity. London had the lowest proportion of disabled people (15.7 percent) compared with 17.9 percent in England and Wales. Despite having contributed £503 billion to the UK’s GDP in 2019, the capital city also features some of the starkest divisions in wealth. Trust for London notes that those in the top wealth decile “hold 44.3% of London’s total net wealth” whilst those in the bottom decile hold none. This can be observed in boroughs such as Lambeth and Southwark, where areas of relative affluence intertwine with areas of abject poverty. 

Prevalence of Crime 

It is necessary to depend upon a number of data points to understand both the prevalence of and trends in crime in the capital city, including absolute volume of crime, crime rate per 1,000 residents, and crime severity score (CSS). 

Figure 26: Overview of the volume of crime, crime rate, and crime severity score in the top 20 London boroughs most affected by crime. Source: Metropolitan Police Service, Police.uk,  Crimerate.co.uk, & Office for National Statistics..

Volume of Crime

In terms of absolute crime volume, the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) recorded 834,394 total notifiable offences (TNOs) for 2021/22, compared with the 6,060,065 offences for England and Wales. When MPS figures for Borough Operational Command Units (BOCUs), there is one obvious outlier.   

Westminster had a significantly higher amount of crimes recorded in the year 2021/22. This is a 68 percent increase from Newham, the borough with the second highest amount of crimes recorded. Excluding the City of London for which statistics are skewed for reasons we will return to later, Westminster also has the highest crime rate in London, at 219 per 1,000 residents. The vast majority of these crimes were theft and violence offences, comprising 47 and 19 percent of TNOs recorded in the borough respectively. There is little publicly available information to explain the apparently abnormal prevalence of crime in this borough. This paucity of literature is a problem in itself. What is available, however, suggests that the borough’s large night-time economy, combined with its status as a tourism hotspot as well as high numbers of commuters may be the primary criminogenic factors responsible for its crime level.

For example, a 2006 examining bag theft within licensed premises, indicated that contemporaneous drive towards 24-hour cities presented a significant risk factor for acquisitive crime. However, without a detailed understanding of the drivers of crime specific to the borough, proposing any kind of meaningful solution is a challenge. The College of Policing notes that research to date suggests visible patrols to be an effective method of reducing overall levels of crime. Whilst ‘more bobbies on the beat’ is an oft-presumed panacea for reducing crime, in this specific case it may prove an effective solution for two key reasons:

Firstly, it can be observed that in 2019/10, theft offences recorded by the MPS  in Westminster reached a ten-year high. During the pandemic lockdown, this figure fell from 44,341 to 12,627 offences. However, in the year since, numbers have begun to climb again. This interruption to trends in criminal activity provides a unique opportunity for the MPS to reassert its presence in criminal activity hotspots across Westminster and buck the spiralling trend of increases in property crime.

This would have the additional effect of increasing public confidence which has slumped to an all time low. Secondly, in its report ‘The police response to burglary, robbery and other acquisitive crime’, HMICFRS notes that just 4 percent of thefts result in a charge. Addressing this situation is key to winning back the confidence of members of the public. Part of this issue lies in the current system for classifying crime. Theft is defined as a ‘volume’ or ‘low-level crime’ but, as identified by a 2023 report by thinktank More in Common, “for the victims of these crimes, the impact is anything but low level”. HMICFRS attributed this inability to respond to serious acquisitive crime to forces lacking capacity “at all stages, from call management to eventual closure of a crime”. The influx of 8,812 officers driven by the Police Uplift Programme (as of 31/10/2022) presents the MPS with a chance to reassess how they assign and deploy resources; if the force is currently ill equipped to secure a higher charge rate, they should instead focus on the prevention of thefts through proven methods, which include visible patrols. 

Whilst heightened patrols may serve as a suitable vehicle for investment in prevention, theft is often a symptom of more deeply rooted social challenges, including substance misuse.

The Government released its ‘Beating crime plan’ in 2021, which stated that 45 percent of thefts (excluding fraud) are committed by people who are addicted to substances. It therefore follows that any attempt to address high levels of theft should also seek to understand and deal with substance misuse. The Government has committed to changing its approach to addiction in its ‘From harm to hope’ plan, an initiative which has seen welcome boosts in funding for local authorities in an effort to rebuild the drug treatment system. According to a guidance document released in April 2022, such funding allocations will be made via the Department of Health and Social Care. Local authorities experiencing proportionally more severe rates of harm can be designated as enhanced funding areas (EFA) on the basis of four factors: rate of drug deaths, deprivation, opiate and crack cocaine prevalence, and crime. Westminster was not one of these areas. This is in spite of the fact that for the majority of these metrics, the borough is one of the worst affected in London.

In 2021, Westminster had the ninth highest rate of drug deaths amongst all London boroughs; nearly double those in Lambeth and Southwark, and more than twice those in Newham. Whilst not the most deprived borough in the capital, Westminster is far from the least, having scored the 20th highest of all London boroughs for income deprivation in the 2019 indices of Multiple Deprivation. Furthermore, according to Trust for London, 36 percent of people in Westminster live in households below average income (HBAI), placing it joint second with Brent and Newham for the highest proportion of people living in poverty.

Data produced by the then Public Health England showed that, in 2016/17, Westminster had an almost identical level of opiate and crack cocaine users to Camden (2,142 and 2,147 respectively). Finally, figures from the House of Commons Library showed that Westminster had the highest drug crime rate of all boroughs across the capital, with 3,221 offences committed in 2020/21, which is consistent with MPS figures demonstrating it has the highest absolute number of crimes across London.

This leaves Westminster with significantly less additional funding for its drug strategy when compared with boroughs experiencing similar challenges such as Camden. Taking into consideration the funding allocation for 2022/23 and the indicative funding allocation for 2023/24, the borough is set to receive £2.3 million less than the latter over the next two years, an outcome which does not reflect the current situation.

Crime Rate

The overall crime rate for London, at 95 per 1,000 residents, is higher than that of the United Kingdom (75.88 per 1,000 people), England (83.77 per 1,000 people), and Wales (81.97 per 1,000 people). Across the 33 boroughs of the capital city, crime rate ranges from 60 crimes per 1,000 residents in Richmond-upon-Thames to 819* in the City of London However, due to the use of the residential population as a denominator in this calculation, this figure is skewed by the small number of people living in this area (c8,600). The fact that the square mile sees roughly 513,000 commuters daily may be a contributory factor to this rate of victimisation. On the other hand, the absolute volume of crimes instead of crime rate, the City of London appears to be the safest of all the boroughs. City of London Police data indicates that there were 8,975 crimes in this area between February 2022 and February 2023. The next highest rate of crime in London is in Westminster at 219 per 1,000 residents, as referenced earlier in the report. 

Figure 29: Highest crime rates per 1,000 residents in London.boroughs. Source: Crimerate.co.uk.

*Based on a figure of 7,961 crimes in a 12 month period as provided by crimerate.co.uk. 

Crime Severity Score  

The Office for National Statistics has released a database illustrating the crime severity score across regions, police force areas, and community safety partnerships (which in most cases equate to local authorities). These statistics aim to provide insight into which areas are affected by more serious crimes. The ONS notes that such statistics are experimental, and are therefore “published in order to involve users and stakeholders in their development, and as a means to build in quality at an early stage”. However, the insight provided by such a dataset can support a deeper understanding of crime in addition to existing metrics such as volume of crime and crime rate per 1,000 residents. 

Figure 30: London Boroughs with the highest crime severity score compared with London overall. Source: Office for National Statistics. 

As with both the absolute volume of crime and the crime rate per 1,000 residents, Westminster is an outlier with a crime severity score of 37.0. This is significantly higher than both the overall score for the capital city (17.4) and the individual score of any other London borough. This is driven, in part, by the sheer scale of crimes committed in Westminster in comparison to other boroughs, a factor which feeds into crime severity scores.

Within the United Kingdom’s legal framework, a disability is defined as an impairment that has a “substantial and long-term adverse effect” on one’s “ability to carry out normal day-to-day activities”. For many forms of neurodiversity, this can be (but is not always) the case. For example, autistic people may have significant support needs which would, according to the Equality Act 2010, constitute a disability. The DSM-5 delineates three ‘levels’ of autistic spectrum disorder. Level 1 is defined as ‘requiring support’, and refers to individuals who “may struggle in social situations and show restricted and repetitive behaviours”. Individuals classified as such require minimal support to function in their daily lives.

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There are several key areas of debate concerning the police, including those concerned with the funding, size, deployment, purpose, remit, and organisation of the institution. This section of the report will address each of these factors in turn, although there are significant intersections within and between. 

As a public sector institution, funding for the police is subject to constant review and revision, resulting in frequent debates and disputes concerning the Government’s decisions. For a significant portion of the 2010s, budgets for policing decreased substantially, driven largely by austerity measures. The Institute for Government argues that “the police in England and Wales have had to adjust to large cuts in funding from central government”. For example, the National Audit Office identified the £7.7 billion received by Commissioners in 2018-19 as “30% less than they received in 2010-11 in real terms.” Ostensibly, overall annual spending for policing has increased year on year since the financial year of 2015-16 from £12.1 billion to £17.0 billion or £17.2 billion, depending on the source. However, taking just this figure into account does not paint the full picture. Data from the Home Office shows that the composition of this funding has changed significantly alongside this increase, with a significant proportion of additional funds being leveraged from the council tax precept, as can be observed from Figure 4.

Figure 4. Overall annual funding for policing since the financial year ending March 2016 (nominal). Source: Home Office. 

It is not simply the size of the overall funding, but how it is structured, decided upon, and disseminated that results in disharmony between the police and central government. One such issue is that said funding is awarded as a one-year settlement, a predicament which the Police Federation argues will cause the institution to “struggle to make sustainable and significant plans beyond next year”, limiting its ability to “prepare for the future and take advantage of procurement economies of scale over multi-year contracts”. This push to update the timescale of funding arrangements for the police is not new and can be traced back at least as far as 2019 in which His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Resource Services (HMICFRS) encouraged the newly elected assembly to “recognise the need for a long-term approach to police funding” which would “enable police leaders to make long-term investments.”. In 2018, the Home Office noted that Police and Crime Commissioners were spending almost a quarter of their overall budgets on goods and services with third party suppliers - an area which could be better addressed if police forces were able to adapt their procurement to longer funding cycles. As such, the Home Office should consider bringing funding arrangements for the police into alignment with other public sector institutions like the National Health Service, extending the settlement from 1 year to 5 years. This would support the national agenda for cost efficiency savings.

As can be observed from figure 4, a significant proportion of the funding from the police is derived from the council tax precept. £4.9 billion of the £17.2 billion awarded to police forces across the country for the financial year 2023-24 originates from this source. However, there is significant variation in the proportion of total funding represented by the council tax precept between the 43 territorial police forces across England and Wales. For example, in 2022, 28 percent of Cleveland Police’s funding was derived from the council tax precept compared to 55 percent for Surrey Police. This means that changes to the size of central funding has a drastically different effect on police forces depending on their ability to leverage funding from their respective local authority. Furthermore, prevalence of crime is typically concentrated in areas which suffer higher rates of income deprivation. This effect can be observed as particularly significant in London, as between January and December 2022, 125,619 crimes were recorded for neighbourhoods in the most deprived decile for income, compared with 82,760 crimes for neighbourhoods in the least deprived decile for income. This represents a staggering increase of 51.7 percent. Simultaneously, it is these neighbourhoods in which council tax is likely to be lower, largely due to lower house prices.

Figure 5: Crimes recorded by neighbourhood income deprivation decile in London (January 2022-December 2022). Source Trust for London. 

The police allocation formula (PAF) has been critiqued for the additional reason that it is based upon data that is a minimum of “nine years out of date”, according to the Institute of Fiscal Studies, This includes population data, used in part as a proxy for crime demand. However, the dataset utilised is derived from the 2001 Census which has since been updated twice. This has the potential to skew the police allocation formula, particularly given the differential trends in population growth. The population in London has grown by 7.7 percent between 2011 and 2021, compared with 3.7 percent in Yorkshire and the Humber and 1.4 percent in Wales.

Figure 6: Population change, 2011 to 2021, Wales and regions of England. Source: Office for National Statistics - Census 2021. 

Reform of the PAF was attempted in 2015, but failed for a number of reasons. At the time, three options were considered: continue with current practice, upgrade the existing PAF, or create a new and simplified model based on a broader range of factors. The Home Office ultimately concluded that the first option “would move force level funding allocations further away from relative need” and that the second “suffered from a number of unresolvable issues, and did not accord with the Government’s principles of a good funding model”. Therefore, a new model was required, one which could “help explain why the demands on police differ between force areas so that relative of required resources can be determined”. However, over seven years have since passed with no sign of reform of the PAF. One of the most significant criticisms of the review at the time concerned the consultation process, specifically the purportedly rushed timescale and lack of transparency over the data underpinning the suggested changes. In the interest of achieving a successful reform process, one that reflects the significant changes that have occurred since the last attempt, it is recommended that consultation for a new review begins as soon as possible. It is equally important that the Home Office, Police and Crime Commissioners, and police forces more broadly work collaboratively to achieve an outcome which is fair by consensus. 

Strength of the Police Force

One of the most significant contentions regarding the police is the number of officers in-post from a singularly quantitative perspective. Different accounts offer slight variations in the exact statistics for serving police officers over time, though there is consensus that the wave of austerity introduced in 2010 by the Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition set against the 2008 financial crisis resulted in a substantial decrease in the overall number. A statistical bulletin from the Home Office in 2019 showed that in 2010, this number peaked at 143,734, and fell each year until 2018, at which point there were 122,405. In 2019 this number began to climb again, due in part to the pledge by the then incumbent Prime Minister, Boris Johnson, to hire 20,000 police officers by the year 2023. 

Figure 7. Number of serving police officers in England and Wales 2010-2019. 

In November 2022, a publication from the House of Commons Library placed the figure at 140,228, significantly closer to the peak value in 2010. However, at the time the pledge by Johnson was made, the Institute for Government noted that the changing mix of crime in recent years including the “steep increase in complex and violent crimes means that deploying additional police on the streets may not be appropriate”, and that complex crimes such as fraud and sexual offences often require “more substantial involvement from other types of police staff including those working in operational and business support.”. Contrastingly, in London over 90,000 mobile phones were stolen over the last year, the equivalent of 1 every 6 minutes. When it comes to policing, the solution must be more officers on our streets and more officers within operation and business support roles. 

Academic evidence to date has struggled to identify and prove a strict cause and effect relationship between the number of serving police officers at a given moment and a reduction in overall crime. Rather, a range of studies, including systematic reviews tend to produce inconsistent results, comprising positive, negative, and null associations between the number of police officers and the level of overall crime. The most recently available review of evidence was performed by Ben Bradford in 2011, performed on behalf of HMICFRS. The review examined 13 pieces of research and concluded, broadly, that much more evidence is required if a causal link of this nature is to be established. However, evidence from a select few of the studies tentatively suggests that a 10 percent increase in officers is associated with a 3 percent reduction in property crime. This is thought to be due to the fact that this type of criminal offence is more highly calculated in terms of cost-benefit, factoring in the presence of police officers as a potential antecedent to sanctions. Other types of crime, such as violent crime, do not appear to have a similar association; this is thought to be due to the often emotional motive which fuels such situations. Whilst this rapid evidence review is the most recent and comprehensive analysis of the link between police numbers and levels of crime, there are two key considerations which support the case for further investigation. Firstly, 11 years have elapsed since the review took place, during which a number of factors critical to such an evaluation have fluctuated significantly. This includes the overall levels of crime and the proportion of crimes which comprise this statistic, as well as the size of the police in England and Wales. Secondly, it is significant that a sizable majority (11/13) of the studies considered for review took place in locations other than England and Wales, including the United States of America, the Netherlands, and Argentina. Each of these locations has a distinct social, cultural, and political context informed by historical events such as interactions between the population and the state and, by extension, the police. This may ultimately detract from the validity of analyses to date and illustrates the necessity to undertake studies specific to England and Wales as a discrete jurisdiction. It would therefore appear that academic evidence to date is inconclusive on what the future size of the police as an institution should be in terms of numbers. Given the growth of complex crime, it is, however, evident that future investment should ensure sufficient personnel extra to the body of serving police officers, including business support and administration. There is also a point to be made about public sense of safety. The College of Policing notes that in the UK, there is “a strong preference for a highly visible police presence” driven by “a desire to see crime reduced”. Simultaneously, evidence to date indicates that patrolling areas “has no effect on crime reduction”. It is therefore in the interests of both the public and the police to arrive at a solution which accounts for this preference without squandering resources on ineffective deployment, an end which may ultimately be best served through an absolute increase in police numbers. . 

As the evidence for this topic is inconclusive, It may therefore prove more fruitful to examine instead how the extant resources of the police may be deployed more effectively to respond to trends in crime and their underlying causes. At this point it is important to state that the substantial decrease in certain offences does not warrant a reduction in the resources and attention afforded to them. After all, 1,151,000 violent crimes and 2,686,000 thefts are no small numbers. Rather, this paper is concerned with what has worked previously to achieve such a reduction, and which strategies may be employed in future to achieve a reduction similar in scale with respect to other types of crime.

Finally, the penny has dropped for some (not all) parliamentarians that we need to build more homes in this country. This week Michael Gove gave a speech where he made a number of announcements including a new Cambridge Quarter providing 250,000 homes and plans to build more densely in cities.

As a former Downing Street advisor, I am not quite convinced that those in power fully grasp the seriousness of the challenge we face due to not building enough homes. Some would rather we did not speak so much about the subject. Below is a reminder of why we need to speak more and not less about housing…

Young Single People and Ownership Rates:

Odds for young single people buying a home are significantly lower than couples (11% versus 52%). This disparity has grown over time, falling by 54% compared to 31% since 1989. Couples have gone from being three times more likely to be able to buy to almost five times more likely.

Ownership Rates and Ethnicity:

In the early 2000s, White young people were, on average, over twice as likely to own a home than Black young people (48% compared with 19%). This inequality has increased over the past two decades, with Black young people now being four times less likely to own a home than White young people (8% versus 32%). The disparity between Chinese young people and White young people has shrunk, falling from 25 percentage points to 2 percentage points from the early 2000s to 2019.

The Decline in Young Ownership Cannot Be Explained by the Make-up of Young People or Changing Preferences:

The ‘35 is the new 25’ theory may account, in part, for the decline. Young people may still want to own a home eventually, but they simply reach major life milestones - such as leaving education and starting work - at an older age than earlier generations. The proportion of young people who are students, single, or non-parents (all of whom are less likely to own their home) has grown, as well as the regional distribution of young people. The proportion of young people who are migrants has, again, grown, with those born outside the UK having less desire to own property in the UK, or being less able to due to structural factors. These compositional factors account for only 13% of the decline.  In more recent years, some of these compositional trends have reversed, helping to explain some of the recovery in youth home ownership. Despite these changes, the collective preference for home ownership remains high. In the late 1980s, just over 80% of young renters would have preferred to own - a trend which has remained stable up until 2018.

Financial Factors as the Main Reason for Young Ownership Declining:

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Crime continues to concern citizens in every part of the United Kingdom. We know that people feel less safe, and that the nature of crimes committed has evolved. But to truly be able to future-proof our country we must delve deeper into what exactly is happening, and so today we launch a new series “Future-proof Tackling Crime”. Part 1 will focus on digging into the data over a period of time. A big thanks to my researcher Conor for his assistance with this:

Data Quality:

Data quality poses a significant barrier to the endeavour of tackling crime as numerous factors, such as how crime is reported, recorded, and sentenced, impact upon the reliability and accuracy of available information. For example, the Office for National Statistics (ONS) notes that increases in metrics including “both the rate and Severity Score for most police forces are likely to reflect recent improvements in recording practices”, rendering data prior to 2014 less reliable. Equally, environmental factors such as the Covid-19 pandemic pose a threat to the continuity of such data. This can be observed in that designated national statistics on the prevalence of crime for the period between March 2020 and June 2022 are unavailable due to interruptions to the Crime Survey for England and Wales (CSEW). This leaves a relatively short snapshot of reliable data to work with. As a result, a range of additional data sources will be considered and integrated in order to provide a more comprehensive analysis of the current systems for understanding and responding to crime in England and Wales. However, considerations of the validity of this data will be maintained throughout. 

What has been published by the ONS speculatively suggests a statistically significant decrease of 8 percent in the overall prevalence of crime affecting individuals aged 16 years and over in England and Wales since the previous recording period (the year ending March 2020). As noted above, this data may not be a true representation of crime in the jurisdiction due to a range of factors; data was recorded over nine months instead of the usual 12 and response rates were lower than in previous years. Other sources, such as CrimeRate, suggest the crime rates per 1,000 people are 77.49 and 75.19 for England and Wales respectively. In turn, these figures represent increases of +5.86 percent and +4.86 percent respectively and were reported by media outlets as “an all-time high” in 2022. It should be noted, however, that police recorded crime data are “not designated as national statistics”, and as such, cannot be considered authoritative to the same extent as the CSEW. 

Prevalence of Crime Over Time

The impact of crime is judged using a range of methods due to the various different sites in which these costs are borne out. Whilst crime in itself is harmful, the secondary effects often exceed the scale of the act in terms of damage to individuals, communities, institutions, and society overall. The most recent available data for the economic impact of crime at the national scale, provided by the Home Office in 2018, estimated the combined cost of commercial crimes and crimes against individuals to be £58.8 billion per year. Despite this staggering cost, there is some data, such as that provided by the CSEW, that suggests that the (overall) prevalence of crime has decreased since the inception of the survey in 1982, at which point 11,303,000 crimes (excluding fraud and computer misuse) were recorded for the previous year. Whilst this figure increased significantly up until December 1995, at which point it peaked at 19,786,000, it has decreased steadily ever since to stand at 9,390,000 in June 2022. The cost of living crisis is likely to result in an uplift in crime rates, as Chair of the John Lewis Partnership  - Sharon White – has recently attested to.

More recently, however, additional metrics have been introduced as a means of understanding not just the prevalence of crime, but also the scale of its impacts. One such measure includes the Crime Severity Score (CSS). The CSS is based on judicial sentencing measures and was developed to complement police recorded crime with a view to measuring change over time and between regions. Such data extends as far back as the period between April 2002 and March 2003, at which point the CSS was 15.9. This dropped year on year to 9.3 for the period between April 2012 and March 2013, at which point the CSS began to rise again steadily (with some fluctuations) until the most recent recording period of April 2021 to March 2022. Presently, the CSS has resumed its peak value of 15.9. Whilst the CSS provides valuable insight into additional dimensions of the impact on crime, due to its reliance on sentencing measures, the metric may be skewed by changes in severity of sentences commensurate with crimes. For example, the average length of a prison sentence has increased from 13.8 months to 18.9 months between 2009 and 2019. The Criminal Justice Act 2003 also resulted in significant inflation of sentences for murder, with sentences having increased since by an average of nine years. Nevertheless, this combination of CSEW and CSS statistics suggest that, while the total number of crimes have ostensibly decreased, the associated impact upon victims has increased inversely as can be observed from Figure 1 below.

Figure 1. Crime Survey for England and Wales and Crime Severity Score 2011-2021.

Whilst based on figures not designated as national statistics, the trend observed above bears investigating further.

Mix of Crime

One possible explanation for the simultaneous decrease in CSEW estimates and increase in CSS is that the blend of crimes being reported has changed over time. A greater prevalence of crimes deemed more serious or lesser prevalence in crimes deemed less serious, according to the CSS, could account for such a pattern. 

Figure 2. Prevalence of selected offences 2012/2022. *Data for sexual offences in 2022 covers only Q1-Q2; actual number expected to be significantly higher. **Comparable data for fraud exists from 2014 onwards which is displayed here. Source: Office for National Statistics.

As can be observed from Figure 2, there have been significant changes in the proportion of certain offences. For example, overall violent crime has reduced significantly from 1,956,000 incidents to 1,151,000. The same is true of overall theft, for which instances have almost halved from 5,360,000 to 2,686,000. Conversely, the prevalence of other types of crimes has grown substantially. 99,715 sexual offences were recorded for the first half of 2022 alone, nearly double the 52,342 recorded for the whole of 2012. Fraud has also burgeoned since 2014, in which 500,225 instances were referred to the National Fraud Intelligence Bureau (NFIB). In 2022, this number was 936,276. Absolute numbers may not tell the full story, however, as instances of crime can be expected to scale with population size - at least to some extent. Instead, it may be more accurate to examine the crime rate per 1,000 people using Census data from 2011 and 2021.

Figure 3. Comparison of crime rates per 1,000 people for selected crimes for 2012 and 2022. Source: Office for National Statistics.

Changes to the profile of England and Wales’ criminological landscape are even more stark when presented in this fashion. Said changes are largely driven by social, cultural, and material shifts in human behaviour. For example, the 2017 ‘#Metoo’ movement and its derivatives such as ‘Everyone’s Invited’ saw a significant rise in reporting to the police which was described by Kate Ellis, a legal professional, as “an indication of victims feeling they will be believed and supported”. This in turn led to the Equality and Human Rights Commission (EHRC) as well as the Women and Equalities Select Committee holding consultations respectively, with the Wera Hobhouse MP bringing forward a Government-backed Private Members’ Bill to introduce protections making employers liable for failing to prevent third party harassment. This series of events clearly demonstrates that social and cultural attitudes towards the systemic efficacy, sincerity, and celerity of those that would receive their disclosure are critical factors in how crime is understood at a given moment. This can be observed more clearly in police recorded crime data as they encapsulate both current and retrospective accounts of offences, whereas CSEW data concerns the past 12 months.

Equally, environmental factors account for a significant proportion of trends in criminal activity and commensurate reporting. Most notable in recent years was the pandemic which saw many isolated from their usual support networks and drove up internet usage, leaving many with little choice but to resort to undertaking their usual activities such as shopping and communicating in digital format. Ofcom shows that the average daily time spent online among adults in the United Kingdom rose from 209 minutes per day to 242 minutes per day. By the end of 2021, incidents of fraud had increased by 32 percent from the previous year, in particular consumer and retail fraud. Additionally, incidents of computer misuse rose by 85 percent, largely driven by unauthorised access to personal information - including hacking. On the other hand, crimes which typically require physical contact such as theft and robbery decreased. What is clear from the influence of such factors is that the current systems for policing and litigating crime are vulnerable, both to their past inadequacies and to volatility within and beyond the environments which they govern. Future efforts to tackle crime must be connected enough to these environments if they are to be successful in understanding changing trends in criminal activity and civilian demands as well as adaptable enough to respond where necessary. Subsequent sections of this report will examine how current approaches to policing, justice, and crime as three key areas of criminology may be adapted and improved in future.

I am sure you have noticed we have a housing crisis… Young people in particular are affected. This autumn we will be launching a cross-party campaign to tackle this most important challenge. Here’s more context about where we are as a nation…

The Situation:

Individuals aged between 25-34 are the most likely to begin their journey in homeownership, and beyond this age the chance of buying a home diminishes rapidly without intervention by major policy change. Renting offers flexibility, but ownership affords stability. 73% of renters surveyed in 2018 would rather own their own home given the choice. Home ownership reduces the risk of high housing costs later in life, provides opportunities for saving as owners are no longer paying rent and saving for a deposit, and can allow for substantial capital gains with the rising cost of housing.

Youth home ownership rates rose rapidly from the 1960s until 1989 with 51% of young family units (a single person or couple living together). This trend rapidly reversed with rates falling to 39% prior to the financial crisis, and have since fallen further to 25% in 2016. There have been tentative signs of a turnaround since with rates rising to 28% on the eve of the pandemic. The picture is not uniform, with significant regional variation. Youth home ownership rates were collapsing in Outer London & the South East before the financial crisis, falling by 25% and 21% respectively between 1989-2006. In the North East and Scotland, rates grew by 5 and 3 percentage points respectively over the same period. Yet accessing ownership is a universal problem for young people, with much less regional variation in 2019 than in 1989.

Additionally, there are stark relative differences in these figures. Ownership has halved for the poorest 40% of young people between 1989-2019, but dropped by 25% for the highest quintile. Ownership rates for the lowest paid occupational groups - elementary and sales workers - have more than halved over this period, whilst managers and senior officials have experienced a far smaller decline and greater post 2016 recovery. Young private sector ownership rates have fallen at twice the rate of their public sector counterparts.  The chances of a young single person owning a house today stand at 11% as compared with 52% compared with couples. In 1989 the chances for couples were around three times greater.

Some argue that the decline in home ownership is due to different lifestyle choices. However, only 13% of the overall decline can be attributed to the changing makeup of the younger generation.

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